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ABSTRACT
In April 1970, Congressman Gerald Ford called for the impeachment
ofJustice William 0. Douglas. Although Douglas had been accused by anti-
civil rights Southern Democrats ofunprofessional conduct in his association
with a political foundation as well as his four marriages, Ford reasoned that,
in addition to the past allegations, Justice Douglas had become a threat to
national security. Within two weeks of Ford's allegations, United States
military forces invaded Cambodia without the express consent of Congress.
Nixon's involvement in Ford's attempts to have Justice Douglas impeached
give rise to the possibility that, in addition to trying to reshape the judiciary
and further architect the "Southern Strategy " by bringing conservative
Southern Democrats into the Republican Party, the impeachment would
serve as a means to divert attention away from the Cambodian invasion.
Ford's irresponsible conduct in this matter (and Justice Douglas's overall
conduct) have never been historically addressed and, as a result, did not
leave to future political leaders and judges a means by which to gauge
behavior that can undermine the independence of the judicial branch. This
Article is intended to provide a historical model of accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 1970, Congressman Gerald Ford, the House of
Representatives' minority leader, delivered a floor speech to his colleagues
in the House of Representatives and demanded the body begin impeachment
proceedings against Justice William 0. Douglas.' Less than two weeks later,
1. 116 CONG. REc. 11,912-19 (1970) [hereinafter Ford Speech] (statement of Rep.
Ford).
114 [Vol. 40:1
SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
President Richard Milhous Nixon ordered a ground invasion of Cambodia.2
Nixon had planned for a joint United States and South Vietnamese assault
into Cambodia prior to Ford's speech, and, six months before this invasion,
Nixon had initiated "Operation Menu," a secretive aerial campaign against
North Vietnamese military targets in Cambodia.3  The invasion into
Cambodia was at odds with Nixon's earlier promise not to expand or enlarge
the United States' role in the Vietnam Conflict; it led to nationwide unrest.4
Oddly, for reasons of secrecy that became emblematic of Nixon's
administration, the President had not conferred with Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird or Secretary of State William Rogers about his final invasion
decision, but he consulted with Henry Kissinger, his national security
advisor, as well as Ford and a small number of other congressmen. Laird
and Rogers earlier had presciently warned Nixon that widening the war into
Cambodia would lead to domestic upheaval, and news leaks over "Operation
Menu" caused Nixon to distrust Laird.6
In the speech preceding the invasion, Ford, a Republican and one of
Nixon's closest congressional allies, alleged that Justice Douglas had
engaged in unethical conduct, such as departing from the duty of
impartiality, accepting unlawful payments, and undermining what today
would be termed as "family values."7 Ford also claimed that the Justice had
encouraged domestic unrest and was involved in various political activities
to the detriment of national security.' While it may not be possible to
determine definitively whether Ford's speech was timed to provide political
cover for the Cambodian invasion or occurred as a matter of coincidence,
2. See, e.g., ANDREW L. JOHNS, VIETNAM'S SECOND FRONT: DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY, AND THE WAR 281-82 (2010).
3. Id. at 281-84; WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 268-69 (1992).
Between April 29 and May 1, 1970, more than 31,000 United States soldiers and a larger
contingent of Army of South Vietnam forces invaded Cambodia. See id; see also Richard D.
Schulzinger, Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRADITION: THE POLITICS OF DISSENT 282, 287 (Randall B. Woods ed., 2003).
4. DAVID F. SCHMITZ, RICHARD NIXON AND THE VIETNAM WAR: THE END OF THE
AMERICAN CENTURY 19 (2014).
5. RICHARD A. HUNT, MELVIN LAIRD AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE POST VIETNAM
MILITARY, 1969-1973, at 149 (2015). Nixon limited the flow of information to a select small
number of legislators including Senators Everett Dirksen, Richard Russell, and John Stennis.
Id. And, in the House of Representatives, he notified Gerald Ford and Leslie Arends, the
Republican minority whip and Nixon loyalist. Id.
6. Id. at 150.
7. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
8. Id. Ford's attack on Douglas was widely reported. See, e.g., Richard Lyons, Ford
Opens Wide Attack on Douglas, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1970; see also Marjorie Hunter, Ford
Asks Douglas's Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1970.
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there is interlinking indicia that the two events were connected as part of an
ideological strategy. 9 This strategy, whether intended or not, politicized the
federal judiciary, threatening judicial independence and encouraging
deference to asserted national security needs over individual rights.
While there is uncertainty why Ford moved to have Justice Douglas
impeached, there is a historic consensus that Ford acted at Nixon's behest.
Most popular theories center on Nixon's desire to reshape the Supreme
Court, a legacy every president would like to leave. Nixon took office in the
wake of President Lyndon Johnson's failed attempt to nominate Justice Abe
Fortas to replace the retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren, and that failed
attempt led to Justice Fortas's resignation from the Court, leaving Nixon with
the immediate opportunity to appoint two Supreme Courtjustices. When the
Senate failed to confirm his first two nominations, Nixon and his allies
sought to use the impeachment of Douglas as payback.
Although Southern Democrats in Congress had previously called for
Justice Douglas's impeachment, the roots of Ford's attempt to remove
Justice Douglas date to 1968. That year, Chief Justice Warren informed
President Johnson that he intended to retire, but not until Johnson had
successfully appointed a new chief justice.'o Chief Justice Warren wanted
to make sure that Nixon, Johnson's likely successor, would be deprived of
the opportunity to appoint a chief justice." This was an unusual mode of
retirement, and it angered Senate conservatives like Samuel Ervin, a North
Carolina Democrat who rhetorically asked whether "the refusal of Chief
Justice Warren to resign until an agreeable successor [was] appointed
dilute[d] the constitutional 'advice and consent' function of the
Senate . . . ." 12  Southern segregationists, "states-rights" politicians, and
9. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 18 (1979). According to reporters Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, once Nixon
came into the presidency, he ordered the Internal Revenue Service and Federal Bureau of
Investigation to investigate Douglas. Id.
10. See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH & TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 308
(1991).
11. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., INSIDE 191 n.* (2004).
12. Letter from Senator Sam Ervin to Senator Clinton Presba Anderson (Sept. 25, 1968),
in CLINTON PRESBA ANDERSON PAPERS, 1938-1973, Box 734 (Library of Cong. comp., 2011).
Ervin was a Southern Democrat who had opposed the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education and signed the so-called "Southern Manifesto." See PAUL R. CLANCY,
JUST A COUNTRY LAWYER: A BIOGRAPHY OF SENATOR SAM ERVIN 173-74 (1974). However,
beginning in 1970, he also became one of the Senate's staunchest opponents against the
government's use of the military in the surveillance of U.S. citizens. Id. at 229-335.
Anderson was a Democrat from New Mexico who supported integration and endorsed Justice
Fortas's nomination as chief justice. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
KENNEDYS 17-18 (2012).
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national conservatives had taken issue with many of the Warren Court's
decisions, and Warren's method of conditionally retiring fueled the anger
against the Court.
Still, Johnson had assurances from Republican Senate Minority Leader
Everett Dirksen, his deputy, Hugh Scott, and Democrat "powerhouse"
Senator Richard Russell that Justice Fortas could be confirmed if Nixon
appointed him for the position of chief justice. 3 Johnson had successfully
nominated Justice Fortas to the Court in 1965 with little Senate opposition
and had scant reason to believe that Justice Fortas would not be confirmed
as chief justice.1 4 But, Justice Fortas had continually provided Johnson
advice on national security and foreign policy matters, such as the conflict
in Vietnam and the United States's invasion of the Dominican Republic, and
then denied these activities under oath.' 5 This led to extended opposition to
Justice Fortas from the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James
0. Eastland, as well as several Southern Democrats and conservative
Republicans. Ultimately, there were not enough legislators to override a
filibuster, and Justice Fortas, unable to secure a majority of the Senate,
resigned from the Court rather than face an impeachment.16
Nixon saw the opportunity to potentially appoint two Supreme Court
justices and appoint the new Chief Justice, essentially reshaping the Court as
he saw fit. He thought to accomplish this by taking advantage of divisions
within the democratic majority. Without a Senate confirmation ofJohnson's
choice for the position, Chief Justice Warren's conditional retirement
couldn't keep the nomination out of the hands of Johnson's successor,
Richard Nixon. Nixon was sworn in as President on January 20, 1969, and
while that put control of the White House in the hands of the Republican
13. Only Senators Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Carl T. Curtis (R-Neb.), and John J.
Williams (R-Del.) voted against Fortas in 1965. See, e.g., NEIL D. McFEELEY, APPOINTMENT
OF JUDGES 188 n.49 (1987).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 142-49 (1988).
16. Id. at 514-25. Although Justice Fortas could have remained on the Court after the
failed nomination, scrutiny by the news media during his confirmation forced his resignation.
Reporters covering the confirmation uncovered evidence that he had received more than
$20,000 annually for serving as a consultant for a foundation created by Louis Wolfson, a
wealthy financier whose appeals from a federal conviction came to the Court during Justice
Fortas's tenure. RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
THE MEDIA 110-11 (2011); see also Ford Speech, supra note 1; MURPHY, supra note 15, at
495-517. Several congressmen demanded Justice Fortas's impeachment on the basis of his
engagement in unethical conflicts of interest, and Attorney General John Mitchell provided
Chief Justice Warren evidence of Justice Fortas's malfeasance. See MURPHY, supra note 15,
at 501-17.
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Party, for the first time in modem history both houses of Congress were
solidly under the control of the Democrats.' 7  It would be reasonable to
assume Democratic opposition and Republican support for Nixon's
nominees, but this would overly simplify the analysis. The Democratic Party
was hardly unified, as southern conservatives and party liberals clashed over
civil rights and Vietnam." While the Senate easily confirmed Chief Justice
Warren Burger, Nixon's choice to replace Chief Justice, it denied
confirmation to his first two nominations to replace Justice Fortas: Clement
Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell.' 9 A coalition of liberal Democrats
and Northern Republicans in the Senate aligned to defeat both nominations
to the anger of not only Nixon, but also Southern Democrats.20 The timing
of Haynsworth's and Carswell's confirmation failures has since led
politicians and historians to conclude that Ford, at Nixon's behest, sought
Douglas's impeachment as political revenge. 2' Ford called for Douglas's
impeachment contemporaneously with Carswell's defeat, gamering support
from an alliance of 104 Southern Democrats and Republicans in the House
of Representatives. 22 Ford admitted that he was irate with the Senate over
Haynsworth and Carswell but denied this was a reason for his call to
17. See ROBERT MASON, RICHARD NIXON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAJORITY 40
(2004).
18. See SEAN J. SAVAGE, JFK, LBJ, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 172 (2004).
19. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 12-15
(1995); see also DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 103-08 (1999).
20. YALOF, supra note 19, at 107.
21. For an example of the historic consensus, see DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF
IMPEACHMENT 106-09 (2008). See also ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY
600-01 (1997); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 777-81
(2000); JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 24-28 (2001); Memorandum by
Richard Sachs, Analyst, American National Government (Oct. 24, 1973), in GERALD R. FORD
VICE PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS, 1949-1973, Box 229 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library)
[hereinafter Memorandum by Richard Sachs]. Sachs's memorandum was created during the
House of Representatives' consideration of Ford's appointment as Vice President after Spiro
Agnew's resignation. According to Sachs, Ford had coordinated with a White House aide,
Clark Mollenhoff, providing evidence that the direction came from Nixon. See Memorandum
by Richard Sachs, supra, at 2. Former Attorney General and Ohio Senator William Saxbe, a
Republican, commented: "In retaliation and probably in a fit of pique, Nixon sicced GOP
House minority leader Gerald Ford on Associate Justice William 0. Douglas." WILLIAM B.
SAXBE, I'VE SEEN THE ELEPHANT 110-16 (2006). Likewise, Abner Mikva, a former
Democratic congressman from Illinois and federal judge, believed Ford's actions had "created
a strong sense of gratitude in President Nixon." ABNER J. MIKVA & PATTI B. SARIS, THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 109 (1983).
22. MIKVA & SARIS, supra note 21.
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investigate Douglas.23 And, while this political animosity may well have
been enough to motivate Nixon to push Ford to move forward with
impeachment allegations, Nixon's personal animosity toward Douglas
stoked the fire. According to John Ehrlichman, Nixon despised Douglas
more than any other federal jurist. The desire to have Douglas humiliated
through the impeachment process could also be translated into a revenge
24
motive.
While this existing political tension between the branches and
accompanying personal animosities might have been one justification for
Nixon seeking the impeachment of Justice Douglas through his allies in the
House of Representatives, it is certainly not the only one. There has been
little study as to the role of "national security" in the impeachment attempt,
and this Article will seek to fill that gap.
This Article argues that the impeachment process was used as political
cover to distract the public from the controversial Cambodian invasion. Ford
did this by making an array of accusations against Justice Douglas, charging
that Justice Douglas had worked to restore the deposed leftist leader of the
Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, to power and had consorted with
organized crime leaders in the process. 25  Ford also claimed that Justice
Douglas had empowered communists and encouraged dissent against the
government. 26 The most damning claim was that Justice Douglas sought an
end to the conflict in Vietnam by permitting the Communists to attain a total
victory.27
This Article is not premised on the argument that Justice Douglas was
a threat to national security; rather, it examines Ford's use of "national
security" in his efforts to have Justice Douglas removed. National security,
to be sure, was not the only basis Ford articulated, but it was the first time
that a justice was publicly accused of undermining it.28 Ford ultimately
23. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
24. See JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NixON YEARS 116 (1982).
25. Ford Speech, supra note 1. According to Ford's aid, Benton Becker, Nixon had
goaded Ford into making these claims, but Becker doubted that the evidence ever existed.
Sam Roberts, Benton Becker, 77, Ford Aide; Negotiated Nixon Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2015, at A21. On Becker's role in Ford's impeachment efforts, see Richard Reeves, Why
American Politicians Are So Bad: The Case History of Gerald Ford, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 13,
1975, at 41.
26. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. For instance, President Abraham Lincoln might have believed that Chief Justice
Roger Brooke Taney had tried to assist the Confederacy, but Lincoln apparently never
concluded that he should push Congress to impeach the Chief Justice. See LUCAS A. POWE,
JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at 120 (2009). Powe writes
that instead of pushing for Taney's impeachment, the Republicans chose to ignore him. Id.
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failed to have Justice Douglas impeached, and, in the words of former White
House counsel John Dean, the failed impeachment attempt created "an
intractable resolve" in Douglas not to resign as long as Nixon remained
president.29
Understanding the mechanics of the impeachment investigation and the
motivations of Nixon, Ford, and Ford's congressional allies is relevant to
contemporary discussions of the judiciary for two reasons. First, their
actions contributed to the politicization of the judiciary, setting an
expectation that the Court must give deference to the national security needs
of the country, particularly when those national security needs are in conflict
with the individual rights of its citizens. This remains true, even if no directly
analogous event has occurred since.30 And, second, the episode evidences
how easily members of the two elected branches of the federal government
can attack the judiciary, often with little lasting accountability. It is true that
this episode, which once gained headlines both nationally and
internationally, has now faded into historical obscurity. But, the episode
remains a quietly influential artifact, in part because none of the individuals
leading the charge suffered as a result of it.3' Ford became vice president
with little congressional opposition. Although Nixon resigned under threat
of impeachment, the impeachment effort against Justice Douglas was never
brought forward as evidence against Nixon. And Justice Douglas, who had
engaged in an unprecedented degree of political activity, remained
obstinately on the Court. The lack of accountability for those involved
leaves open the possibility for today's elected officials, if they so choose, to
politicize the judiciary without the constraints of historic accountability.
Constructed as a legal history, this Article examines the use of "national
security" in the impeachment process. At no point in this Article is there a
defense of Justice Douglas's extrajudicial actions, notwithstanding the fact
that, throughout history, several justices, including some of Justice
Douglas's contemporaries, also engaged in non-judicial activities of a
political nature.32 Rather, it is intended to show how those extrajudicial
29. DEAN,supra note 21, at 26.
30. Perhaps the actions of the current commander-in-chief in accusing a federal judge of
endangering the nation is closely analogous, but in the author's opinion there is a difference
between an allegation against a judge and a Supreme Court justice. Nonetheless, there is a
danger to judicial independence in the commander-in-chief's actions. See, e.g., Eric Levitz,
Trump Just Declared the 'Court System' a Threat to National Security, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 6,
2017.
31. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 101-02 (1998) (defining "legal
artifact").
32. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953-1969, at
303-04 (2005).
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activities, whether innocuous or not, allowed the Nixon Administration and
its congressional allies to pursue impeachment of a sitting Supreme Court
justice by appealing to the nationalist security fears of congressional
"defense hawks." Had the effort been successful, it would have allowed
Nixon to dramatically shape the future of the Court by appointing a third
justice to the bench; it also would have served as a public distraction that
enabled his administration to move forward with the controversial invasion
of Cambodia with far less public outcry. This Article is divided into four
parts.
Part I provides a contextual overview of the political climate of the late
1960s, particularly the tension between the branches of government. It also
provides a brief background on Justice Douglas's approach to national
security, including the political reaction against his judicial decisions. Part I
also highlights Justice Douglas's stridency against the use of United States
military forces in the Vietnam conflict. Finally, it includes a brief analysis
on the "state" of federal judicial ethics in the period leading up to the
impeachment investigation.
Part II presents Ford's claims against Justice Douglas and the creation
of the House Judiciary Committee's investigation into him. This Part also
analyzes the timing of Ford's actions in light of the United States' military
invasion into Cambodia. Further, it examines Ford's claims that Justice
Douglas had tried to undermine the stability of pro-American governments
in Latin America, particularly the Dominican Republic.
Part III of this article analyzes the investigation into Douglas and the
public reaction to the investigation. Part IV examines congressional and
news media reactions to Ford's claims as a means for assessing why he failed
in his efforts to dislodge Justice Douglas from the Court.
Finally, this Article concludes by discussing not only why this episode
should be better understood, but also how it should be used as a barrier to
protect the judiciary against claims that judges have undermined the nation's
security.
I. THE WARREN COURT, JUSTICE DOUGLAS, AND THE VIETNAM WAR
An examination of the effort to impeach Justice Douglas must take into
account the relationship between the judiciary and the legislative branch.
During Chief Justice Warren's tenure, the Court issued decisions mandating
equal treatment in public education and other government institutions,
restricting school prayer, and enhancing the rights of the accused in criminal
2018] 121
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trials.33 While these decisions were ultimately heralded by the majority of
the population as not only constitutionally correct but also morally essential
to the ideals of democracy, they angered southern politicians who claimed
the Court was undermining the Constitution.3 4  When the Court began
overturning convictions and ending employment discrimination based on
allegations of ties to communism (or organizations the attorney general
determined to be "subversive"), right-wing organizations like the John Birch
Society undertook an "impeach Warren campaign," erecting billboards
across the country claiming the Court had sided with communism.35
A more serious criticism was levelled against the Court by the
American Bar Association. During its 1957 conference in London, its
Special Committee on Communism claimed the Court had weakened
national security.3 6 Chief Justice Warren resigned from the American Bar
Association in response.3 7 Because Douglas was a leading voice on the
Court against state and federal investigations into persons based on alleged
ties to communism, he, too, was a natural target for conservatives'
accusations of communist sympathies.38
A. Congressional "Defense Hawks" vs. Justice Douglas
Conservative Southern Democrats began to argue that Justice Douglas
was a threat to national security after he attempted to prevent the executions
of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. 39 The Rosenbergs had been convicted of
providing the Soviet Union classified information on nuclear weaponry and
33. DAVIS, supra note 16, at 104; see also Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical
Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT 293-312 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
34. See POWE, supra note 28, at 244-45.
35. DAVIS, supra note 16, at 104; KYVIG, supra note 21, at 35 (2008); see also, CHRISTINE
L. COMPSTON, EARL WARREN: JUSTICE FOR ALL 130-32. Because its members could be
considered "fringe," the John Birch Society had at best a nominal effect on the public's
perception of the Court. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 389
(1997). The fringe nature of this organization, as Cray pointed out, could be found in the fact
that its leaders accused President Dwight Eisenhower of sympathizing with communism, as
well. Id.
36. ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA REPRESSION: ONE
HUNDRED DECISIONS 105-06 (2012).
37. HALL, supra note 33, at 307.
38. Move To Impeach Douglas Quashed, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1953.
39. See Impeaching Justice Douglas?: Shape ofthe Coming Battle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 20, 1970, at 26. In 1962, Senator John Tower cited to Douglas's publication,
"Freedom of the Mind," as evidence that he lacked the objectivity to determine national
security appeals. Id.
122 [Vol. 40:1
SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
sentenced to death.4 0 After several appeals, the Rosenbergs were executed,
but only after Justice Douglas had delayed the execution by ordering a stay.41
Justice Douglas's judicial record on appeals arising from the Vietnam
conflict provided his opponents with further evidence of his views on the
divisiveness of war, particularly dissents in which he would have sided with
parties challenging the constitutional authority of the government to
conscript citizens to fight in an undeclared war. For instance, in 1968 he
dissented in Zwicker v. Boll, a per curiam decision that upheld the denial of
injunctive relief against Wisconsin's disorderly conduct statute, which had
been challenged by University of Wisconsin graduate students who protested
the United States' involvement in Vietnam.42 The students' suit challenging
the constitutionality of the statute had been dismissed by the lower court, and
the Supreme Court affirmed that decision.43 Justice Douglas noted that
disorderly conduct statutes have been used historically to silence "unpopular
groups of persons who espouse unpopular causes," and he believed that the
students had "adequately alleged in their complaint that their arrests and
prosecutions were effected in bad faith and in a discriminatory manner in
order to punish and discourage exercise of constitutionally protected
rights."44
Justice Douglas also dissented in the landmark case United States v.
O'Brien, which upheld a conviction for the destruction of a "draft card" in
protest of the war.45  He took exception to the majority's view that
congressional power "to raise and support armies" is "broad and sweeping"
and that Congress's power "to classify and conscript manpower for military
service is beyond question" without a declaration of war.46 Douglas
concurred with the Court's decision in Powell v. McCormack, which held
that Congress could not refuse to seat a duly elected member who had also
been accused of criminally misappropriating public funds before the
election.4 7 Douglas added that the refusal to seat a member because of anti-
war views would also be unconstitutional. 48 And, in O'Callahan v. Parker,
40. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, reh'g
denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952) (affirming the trial court's conviction and sentence).
41. LORI CLUNE, EXECUTING THE ROSENBERGS 118 (2014).
42. Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 354, 356 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
46. Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
48. Id. at 551 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court had already determined that the
Georgia legislature's refusal to seat a state legislator who had been an anti-war leader was
unconstitutional. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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Douglas led a majority of the Court to significantly limit the military's
jurisdiction to prosecute its servicemembers in courts-martial, even though
Congress, in enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice, had provided
for universal jurisdiction over servicemembers.4 9
His decisions drew the ire of Congressman Felix Edward H6bert, a
conservative Southern Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee.o H6bert complained to Chief Justice Burger that Justice
Douglas's act of ordering the Secretary of the Army to release Captain
Howard Levy from its prison at Fort Leavenworth threatened the Army's
readiness and discipline." Levy had been convicted in a contentious court-
martial for mutinous-type offenses and sentenced to three years in prison.5 2
His court-martial and subsequent appeals became a cause celebre in the
media.5 3 H6bert, apparently ignorant to the principle of judicial
independence, asked Chief Justice Burger to disqualify Justice Douglas from
"passing judgment on any cases involving Vietnam, the draft, or the military
in general."5 4
The letter to Chief Justice Burger was not H6bert's first complaint
against Justice Douglas to a member of the judiciary. He had previously
written two letters to Chief Justice Warren asking him to prohibit Justice
Douglas from deciding appeals arising from the Vietnam War; in all three
letters, H6bert claimed Justice Douglas had empowered both domestic anti-
war movements and communist forces in Vietnam by enjoining the
49. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); see also Joshua E. Kastenberg, Cause
and Effect: The Origins and Impact of Justice William 0. Douglas's Anti-Military Ideology
from World War II to O'Callahan v. Parker, 26 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 163 (2009) (discussing
Justice Douglas' overall intent in this decision).
50. See ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN
LOUISIANA, 1915-1972, at 81 (1995); FRANK J. SMIST, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1989, at 6-7 (2nd ed. 1994).
51. Letter from Representative Felix E. Hebert to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Aug.
8, 1969), in HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK PAPERS, 1883-1976, Box 59 (Library of Cong. comp.,
2000) (contained in a memorandum from Charles Morgan, Levy's attorney, to Senator Sam
J. Ervin and forwarded to Justice Black).
52. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736 (1974); see Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War
on Trial: The Court-Martial ofDr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 839, 841.
53. Strassfeld, supra note 52, at 839. In 1974, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-three
decision, with Justice Thurgood Marshall not participating, upheld Levy's conviction.
Parker, 417 U.S. at 762. Justice Douglas dissented on the basis that the offenses for which
Levy had been found guilty violated the First Amendment, even in the military context. Id
at 766, 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, along with Justice Brennan, also joined
in Justice Stewart's dissent, which argued that the statutes under which Levy had been court-
martialed were unconstitutionally vague. Id at 773 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Letter from Representative Felix E. Hebert to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, supra
note 51.
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deployment of called-up reservists to Vietnam by the Department of
Defense.
B. Justice Douglas's Political Activities
There is historic consensus that Justice Douglas visibly mixed politics
and jurisprudence to an unusual degree in comparison to the other justices of
his time. Douglas was a prolific writer, and in 1952 he authored an article
in Look Magazine titled "We Have Become Victims of the Military Mind." 56
Justice Douglas's basic premise was that following the defeat of Germany
and Japan in World War II, and with the onset of the Cold War, former and
active military officers staffed much of the government and, as a result, the
federal government undertook a monolithic approach toward not only
communism, but also toward other minority beliefs.
In the same year, Justice Douglas also championed Ngo Diem, the
president of South Vietnam, as Asia's "hero in Central and North Vietnam,"
in essence supporting the anti-democratic leader. Justice Douglas's
detractors pointed out that, during World War II, he sided with the Court's
majority in upholding severe limits on the constitutional liberties of citizens
who were of Japanese descent and in protecting President Roosevelt's
authority as Commander in Chief in a number of other significant ways.59
Yet, by the late 1940s, Justice Douglas began to urge constraints on the
55. See Letter from Representative Felix E. Hebert to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Sept.
19, 1968), in HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK PAPERS, 1883-1976, Box 59 (Library of Cong. comp.,
2000); Letter from Representative Felix E. Hebert to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Jan. 24,
1969), in HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK PAPERS, 1883-1976, Box 69 (Library of Cong. comp.,
2000); Judicial Shop-Around, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1968 (reporting on Justice Douglas's
stay that prevented the government from sending soldiers in the Army Reserves into duty for
service in Vietnam).
56. William 0. Douglas, We Have Become Victims of the Military Mind, LOOK MAG.,
Mar. 11, 1952, at 34.
57. Id.
58. SETH JACOBS, AMERICA'S MIRACLE MAN IN VIETNAM 41 (2004).
59. Robert Jerome Glennon, Commentary: Collegialism and Change Over Time: William
0. Douglas as Justice, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 51, 55 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990). A number of cases show Justice
Douglas's support for Roosevelt's assertions of Executive Branch authority in wartime. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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Executive Branch.6 0 In 1967, he went so far as to accuse President Johnson
of using conscription to punish campus activists.6 '
In February 1970, Justice Douglas published Points of Rebellion, a
treatise in which he posited that people might overthrow the government-
just as the colonists removed George III's authority over them-because of
an overarching military surveillance over the citizenry and the encroachment
of the nation's intelligence agencies into college campuses. 62  Justice
Douglas used the campus terminology of the day in describing government
functions as "Big Brother" and "the establishment." 63 Following publication
of Points ofRebellion, several critics called for his removal from the Court.64
To conservatives like Ford, Points ofRebellion became a "proof point" that
Justice Douglas intended to undermine national security and that his judicial
decisions had to be examined alongside the book.
C. The House ofRepresentatives'Judiciary Committee
One key to understanding how the impeachment attempt played out is
to understand the inner workings and dynamics within the House of
Representatives, particularly the House Judiciary Committee. The House of
Representatives' Judiciary Committee is that body's sole committee for the
regulation of the federal judiciary. Established in 1813, the Judiciary
Committee is among the oldest standing committees in the House.65 It is also
60. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (setting aside an order to deport
Harry Bridges, who had been affiliated with a labor union accused of communist ties);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 184 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (opposing the
executive branch's assertion that classifications of aliens were non-reviewable by the courts);
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that Japanese
prisoners of war could not be automatically deemed without redress to the United States
courts): Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 792 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Executive Branch could not deny habeas appeals to the federal courts for aliens-even
belligerent aliens-held in captivity).
61. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 39 (1969).
62. Id. at 95. Douglas notably challenged, "The Pentagon has a fantastic budget that
enables it to dream of putting down the much-needed revolutions which will arise in Peru, in
the Philippines, and in other benighted countries. Where is the force that will restrain the
Pentagon?" Id. at 41. It should also be noted that Random House, a New York-based
publisher with a global distribution system, published Douglas's book. Id at tit. p.
63. Id. at 29, 97.
64. See, e.g., Israel Shenker, Justice Douglas Says Revolution May Be Only Honorable
Reply to Oppression, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1970; A Justice Disgraces the Supreme Court, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 13, 1970; Daniel Seligman, Revolution, Rant and Justice Douglas, LIFE MAG.,
May 1, 1970.
65. 1 THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 45 (Steven Harmon Wilson ed.
2012).
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the busiest of the House's committees. Its chairman in 1970, Emanuel
Celler, noted that more than one-third of all bills considered by the House
were forwarded to his committee for review and voting.66 While the
committee is key to understanding the impeachment effort, it is also
important to recognize that it lacks the power of its Senate counterpart.
Indeed, Ford lamented in his speech how little influence the House of
Representatives had in the nomination of federal judges.67 After all, the duty
of confirming presidential nominations is wholly vested in the Senate.68
Pursuant to the House's rules in 1970, impeachment resolutions were
brought to the Judiciary Committee, as were complaints of significant
judicial misconduct.6 9 However, within the committee, there was no specific
subcommittee tasked with investigating judicial misconduct; when such
allegations arose, the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority
party member appointed members from their respective parties to conduct
the investigation. For instance, between 1966 and 1968, the Judiciary
Committee created a special subcommittee to review allegations of
misconduct against a United States District Court judge named Stephen S.
Chandler. 70 The subcommittee, which consisted of two Democrats and two
Republicans, was not directly tasked with considering Judge Chandler's
impeachment.7 It concluded that both Judge Chandler and his accusers,
including two judges on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, had
behaved in a manner that undermined the public's confidence in the federal
judiciary.7 2
Usually, when a congressman or congresswoman calls for an
impeachment against an Executive Branch officer orjudge, the impeachment
processes, including investigations, begin by assigning the matter to the
66. MORRIs S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY 129 (1976).
67. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 26 (2d ed., Univ. of
Chi. Press 2000). Gerhardt writes:
[T]he House Judiciary Committee's investigation of William 0. Douglas may have
begun for partisan reasons, but it ended in a report that found no grounds for
impeachment. Although Justice Douglas's life-style, including his four marriages,
and much of his decision making provoked hostile reactions from many
Republicans, the impeachment investigation ultimately exposed and perhaps even
diffused the personal or partisan motivations for his attempted impeachment.
Id. at 29.
70. See H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966).
71. Id.
72. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 298 U.S. 74, 12425 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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Judiciary Committee.7 3 If articles of impeachment are drafted, they are
provided to the full House, which must approve the articles by a majority
vote before the articles can transition into the Senate for an impeachment
trial.74 Constitutionally, a single member of the House may initiate an
impeachment vote against a president, vice president, or executive officer
whose position occurred as a result of the Senate confirmation process.
But, a majority of the House must determine that impeachment is merited
before forwarding articles of impeachment to the Senate.76 The Constitution
requires two-thirds of the senators' votes to remove a federal judge from
office. The operative basis for impeachment is the commission of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."7 ' Although the process is called a trial, it is
non-reviewable in the federal courts. 7 9  And, although the Judiciary
Committee serves as a quasi-grand jury, few of the normal grand jury rules
apply, including the sealing of evidence.so
At the time of Ford's April 15 speech calling for Justice Douglas's
impeachment, Celler, the Judiciary Committee's chairman, had served in
Congress for forty-seven years.8 ' He had also served on the Judiciary
Committee since 1924 and been its chairman for eleven congresses. 82 He
would be the congressman responsible for overseeing an impeachment
investigation of Douglas.83
Ford and his congressional allies might have found it disturbing that
Celler was involved in an investigation into Justice Douglas for three
reasons. First, Celler was an ardent champion of civil rights. He had
73. See, e.g., III ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2400 (1907) (moving to refer an impeachment
claim against President Andrew Johnson to the Judiciary Committee); id at § 2469 (directing
the Judiciary Committee to inquire and report on the alleged misconduct of Judge Charles
Swayne, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Florida).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
75. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; HINDS, supra note 73, at §§ 2342, 2400, 2469.
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
77. See id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7.
78. Id. art. II, § 4.
79. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236-38 (1993).
80. See Jonathan Turley, Congress As Grand Jury: The Role of the House of
Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735,
771-77 (1999).
81. See MARGARET SANDS ORCHOWSKI, THE LAW THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF AMERICA:
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965, at 54 (2015) ("Emanuel (Manny) Celler
was the Jewish congressman from Manhattan since 1923 and leader of the House Judiciary
Committee for some 40 years.").
82. See id. at 55.
83. Id. at 54-55.
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confronted southern congressmen over the treatment of African
Americans.8 4 He had also advocated for a more expansive immigration
policy for refugees after witnessing the closure of the United States to Jews
fleeing Europe in the late 1930s and 1940s."
Second, Celler had not been receptive to the types of reforms that
conservatives sought to impose on the judiciary. During his chairmanship,
he received several legislative proposals to modify the Court's jurisdiction
or alter the means by which the justices determined that a law was
unconstitutional, which he refused to submit to the committee for debate.
For instance, in 1966, Congressman Earle Cabell, a conservative Texas
Democrat, introduced legislation that would have required two-thirds of the
justices to overturn a state or federal law on the basis of the law's
unconstitutionality.8 6 Celler had also previously refused to consider calls to
investigate Justice Douglas's activities. Prior to the 1970s, conservatives
called for Justice Douglas's removal after he authored articles in Playboy
Magazine and questioned whether his marital history, which did not reflect
appropriate family values, made him unfit to sit on the nation's highest
court." Under Celler's control of the committee, both efforts failed.8 9
Additionally, in the days leading up to Ford's speech, Celler joined forty
other congressmen condemning Ford for attacking the "integrity and
independence of the United States Supreme Court." 90
Finally, Ford might have been concerned with Celler because he and
Justice Douglas were "New Deal" liberals and, more importantly, had been
friends. 9' In 1967, when Justice Douglas was unable to attend a New York
84. See MARVIN CAPLAN, FARTHER ALONG 202 (1999).
85. ORCHOWSKI, supra note 81, at 55.
86. H.R.J. Res. 1124, 89th Cong. (1966); Letter from Representative Earle Cabell to
Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Apr.
28, 1966), in EMANUEL CELLER PAPERS, 1924-1973 (Library of Cong. comp., 2012).
Although Celler responded to Cabell that the proposed bill was "intriguing" and promised to
give it his "personal study," letter from Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of
Representatives Judiciary Comm., to Representative Earle Cabell (May 2, 1966), in EMANUEL
CELLER PAPERS, 1924-1973 (Library of Cong. comp., 2012), the proposal was never sent to
the House Judiciary Committee.
87. James J. Kilpatrick, Justice Douglas and Playboy, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1969, at II-
9.
88. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL 366-70 (2003); see also Contempt of
Court..., VA. L. WKLY., Apr. 25, 1963.
89. Memorandum by Richard Sachs, supra note 21, at 20-21.
90. Id. at 12 (quoting Marjorie Hunter, FordAsks Douglas'Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1970).
91. Letter from Representative Emanuel Celler Chairman, Hour of Representatives
Judiciary Comm., to Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas (Feb. 11, 1946), in WILLIAM 0.
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State Society dinner honoring Celler, Celler responded to Justice Douglas
that "it is good enough to know I have your friendship and you have mine."92
In spite of their friendship, Celler did not publicly support Justice Douglas
in all matters. When the Los Angeles Times discovered that Justice Douglas
had written Albert Parvin, one of the focal points of Ford's allegations, a
letter condemning the Internal Revenue Service for investigating him, Celler
publicly criticized Justice Douglas for undermining the public's confidence
in the judiciary.9 '
It should be clear to see why Ford was nervous about Celler's
participation in the Judiciary Committee's investigation into Justice
Douglas. As head of the investigating committee, Celler had great power to
steer the investigation. Without his approval, the impeachment process
would likely go nowhere. Ford also knew that Celler had often opposed the
policy decisions of Southern Democrats-the same individuals who sought
to impeach Justice Douglas-and was unlikely to align with them in their
effort. Celler also had a history of deferring to the judiciary to regulate and
police the ethics of its judges. He had opposed attempts to impose reforms
on the judiciary, many of which formed the basis of the charges against
Justice Douglas. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Ford did not want
Celler to head the committee because of his friendship and personal history
with Justice Douglas. During his tenure as chair of the Judiciary Committee,
Celler had been called on to investigate Douglas twice, and each time, he had
ensured the investigations failed. Correspondence between the two men
showed just how close their friendship was. Ford must have known it would
DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 315 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014). In 1946, Celler
invited Justice Douglas to attend a meeting in support of a "Jewish State" in Palestine. Id.
92. Letter from New York State Society to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1967), in WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS PAPERS,
1801-1980, Box 315 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014); Letter from Representative Emanuel
Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., to Assoc. Justice William 0.
Douglas (Mar. 31, 1967), in WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 315 (Library of
Cong. comp., 2014). On April 18, 1973, Celler wrote to Douglas: "I congratulate you on the
34th anniversary of your appointment as a member of the United States Supreme Court. You
have indeed been a credit to that bench and a tower of strength to the nation. You have sought
out new judicial trails and have done your work wisely and courageously." Letter from
Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., to
Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas (Apr. 18, 1973) in WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-
1980, Box 315 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014). Douglas replied that he "cherish[ed] such
praise. . . ." Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Representative Emanuel
Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 24, 1973) in WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 315 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
93. George Lardner Jr., Celler Raps Douglas on Letter to Parvin, WASH. POST, May 28,
1969, at A4.
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be a tall order to impeach Justice Douglas, especially with Celler in charge
of the Judiciary Committee.
D. Justice Douglas and the "Sordid State" ofJudicial Ethics in 1970
Perhaps, because Justice Douglas had been a "sponsor" to Justice
Fortas, and because the lives of the two men had been intertwined, it should
have been foreseeable that Justice Douglas's opponents would "tar him" with
allegations similar to those which forced Justice Fortas's retirement. 94
Justice Douglas's involvement with the Parvin Foundation provided just
such an opportunity.
Named after its founder, Albert Parvin, a furniture magnate and casino
owner, the Parvin Foundation was designed to bring foreign government
officers and academics to the United States for educational programs in an
effort to promote democracy.9 5 Both Justices Douglas and Fortas received
money from wealthy benefactors in exchange for chairing academic
organizations, and in both instances the wealthy benefactors were suspected
of criminal fraud. Justice Fortas's sponsor, Louis Wolfson, was convicted. 96
To Justice Douglas' consternation, Parvin's company was investigated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission for fraud in its stock market
valuation, 97 and the Internal Revenue Service likewise targeted Parvin's
foundation.98 In 1966, the Los Angeles Times reported that Justice Douglas
94. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 15, at 3-33. Under oath, Justice Fortas had denied
advising President Lyndon Johnson on matters such as the President's Vietnam policies, but
this was untrue. Id. Moreover, Justice Fortas's previously unreported acceptance of monies
from Louis Wolfson though American University were ultimately the reason that led to his
resignation. Id
95. MURPHY, supra note 88, at 366-67 (2003).
96. United States v. Wolfson, 282 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd 405 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).
97. SEC v. Parvin/Dohrmann Co., No. 69 Civ. 4543, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12985
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1969); see also Firm's Chairman Hits Investigation by SEC, L.A. TIMES,
May 27, 1969, at 6.
98. Douglas Says Tax Inquiry Aims to Get Him off Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1969;
see also Douglas Note Sharpens Controversy on Court, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1969, at 1.
Justice Douglas had reason to fret over his relationship with Parvin, and his communications
to Parvin evidenced that concern. In 1961, Justice Douglas warned Parvin that an individual
named "Mr. Frimet," who had inquired about the foundation's financial status; Douglas
seemed to be wary of him. Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Albert Parvin
(May 1, 1961), in RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY COMM. AND RELATED COMMS., 1813-1988,
RECORDS OF THE H.R., 1789-1990, Record Group 233, Box 88, AP File (National Archives).
Parvin's answer to Justice Douglas displays political naivety on Parvin's part and
circumstantially could evidence the lack of an affiliation with organized crime in which he
would have been suspicious of Frimet. Parvin wrote: "Your note of May 1st regarding Gilbert
M. Frimet is before me and it has taught me to be more reticent in replying to such
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served as a paid director of the Parvin Foundation.9 9 On October 17 of that
year, Senator John J. Williams, a Delaware Republican, called for the Senate
to investigate Justice Douglas's relationship with the foundation, not on the
grounds that the foundation had endangered national security, but because
Justice Douglas's paid position on the foundation was unethical in light of
his position as a justice. 00 Justice Douglas countered to Chief Justice
Warren that, because Parvin had no appeals pending before the Court (and
that if any appeals were to come before the Court he would recuse himself),
Williams's criticisms were without merit.'0 ' Chief Justice Warren, in turn,
provided Williams with materials that he believed answered the Senator's
concerns. 02 Contemporaneously, Congressman Harold Royce Gross, an
Iowa Republican known for his acerbic behavior, publicly criticized Justice
Douglas for accepting an annual payment of $12,000 from the foundation
and demanded Justice Douglas's resignation.' 03 On May 27, 1969, the Los
Angeles Times reported that Justice Douglas had decided to resign from his
position in the Parvin Foundation.1 04 Justice Douglas's resignation from the
foundation, which followed closely in the wake of Justice Fortas's
promiscuous letters concerning the Foundation. While Mr. Frimet's letter did not state that
he was writing me with your knowledge, the inference was that he did know you and was
writing me at your request." Letter from Albert Parvin to Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas
(May 4, 1961), in RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY COMM. AND RELATED COMMS., 1813-1988,
RECORDS OF THE H.R., 1789-1990, Record Group 233, Box 88, AP File (National Archives).
99. DOUGLAS FRANTZ & DAVID MCKEAN, FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES 7 (1995).
100. Senator Urges Court Inquiry on Role ofDouglas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1966; Dirksen
Hints New Douglas Data In Drive for Judicial Ethics Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1966.
Williams argued:
Justice Douglas' acceptance of payments totaling around $50,000 over the past
4 years from this Las Vegas operation raises a serious question as to its propriety as
well as its legality. It also raises a serious question as to whether he should now be
permitted to remain on the Court.
Membership on the Supreme Court is a lifetime appointment. The Associate
Justices receive a lifetime annual salary of $39,500 per year which continues even
after they retire. The lifetime appointment with this liberal pension was provided
in order to insulate members of the Supreme Court from the necessity of being
dependent upon outside income either during or after their appointments.
112 CONG. REC. 27,215 (1966).
101. Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Oct. 31,
1966), in EARL WARREN PAPERS, 1930-1974, Box 352 (Library of Cong. comp., 2000);
102. Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Senator John J. Williams (Oct. 31, 1966), in
EARL WARREN PAPERS, 1864-1974, Box 49 (Library of Cong. comp., 2000).
103. He'll Offer Impeachment Resolution: Justice is Urged to Resign, WASH. POST, June
9, 1969.
104. Ronald J. Ostrow & Robert L. Jackson, Douglas Letter to Parvin Sharpens Court
Controversy, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1969, at 2. The Los Angeles Times was not alone in its
reporting. See Lardner, supra note 93.
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resignation, led to allegations that Justice Douglas recognized he had
engaged in illicit extrajudicial activities.'o
By the end of 1968, there was a general perception in Congress that the
ethical standards of the federal judiciary were far too malleable. Senator
Ervin referred a draft bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee that would have
prohibited federal judges from "engag[ing] or participat[ing]" in "the
exercise of any power, or the discharge of any duty, which is conferred or
imposed upon any officer or employee of the executive branch or the
legislative branch of the Government."1 06  In essence, Ervin sought to
prevent judges from advising the president on draft legislation or on
domestic, foreign, and military policies.
At the same time, Senator Joseph Tydings, a Maryland Democrat,
introduced a bill to create a "Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure," which would comprise five judges and be chaired by the chief
justice.'o7 This commission would have the power to inquire into the conduct
of all federal judges.'os If four of the judges agreed that a federal judge had
violated judicial standards, the commission would recommend to the House
Judiciary Committee that a judge be subject to impeachment.1 09 Later that
year, Tydings addressed the Catholic University Law School on the need for
judicial reform." 0 He claimed that Congress had to legislate a standard of
"good behavior" for the judiciary because the judiciary had failed to follow
its own standards."' Tydings argued that mandatory reporting of income
and gifts, as well as regulations on judicial activities, were not a threat to the
judiciary's independence but, rather, would bolster public confidence in the
judiciary.11 2 To that end, Tydings noted that the federal judiciary must
"realize that not every attempt to monitor their conduct constitutes
hazing."113
Chief Justice Warren was also concerned with the justices' extrajudicial
activities and convened a judicial conference to convince the justices to
adopt a more stringent ethics code, mirroring the code governing the lower
105. See, e.g., Justice Douglas Quits as Paid Head of the Parvin Foundation, CHI. TRB.,
May 24, 1969, at 7.
106. S. 1097, 91st Cong. (1969).
107. S. 1516, 91st Cong. § 377 (1969).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Tydings, Address to Catholic University, Nov. 6, 1969.
111. Id.
112. John P. Mackenzie, Tydings Attacks Ruling on Judges'Activities, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1969, at 10.
113. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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federal judiciary.11 4  On June 10, 1969, the Judicial Conference, an
administrative agency overseen by the chief justice, issued guidelines to
govern the conduct of judges."' The Judicial Conference was, in effect,
responding to Tydings's bill and, indeed, matched its guidelines to the
proposed legislation.1 6 The guidelines included the creation of a judicial
board to monitor the income and assets of other judges." 7 Justice Douglas
wrote to his colleagues to share his reasons for opposing the Judicial
Conference's new rules."' He reminded his colleagues that any new
requirements imposed on judges must be enacted by Congress." 9 "Judges
have no authority to tell other judges what to do," he said before asking
whether the Supreme Court would also be monitored and overseen by judges
in the lower judiciary.1 2 0 One rule which particularly galled Justice Douglas
was that judges would have to first seek the approval of the Conference
before publishing an article, traveling, or accepting compensation for
lecturing or writing.12' He "deplored seeing judges withdraw into a
cloistered life" and felt that a rule requiring judges to submit their literary
work or speeches for review was merely a form of judicial censorship.1 22
Justice Douglas's position placed him in a vulnerable political position in the
sense that it provided his congressional critics with fodder that he
disregarded judicial ethics and norms.
While Tydings's bill was pending and the chief justice's Judicial
Commission was still formulating its recommendations, Congressman
Robert Alphonso Taft, Jr., the grandson of Chief Justice and President
William Howard Taft, introduced a bill that would have required federal
judges to provide the Comptroller General with copies of their complete tax
filings, including any spousal incomes and the names and addresses of
professional corporations, businesses, foundations, or other enterprises in
114. Fred P. Graham, Justices Rebuff Warren On Code, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1969, at 1.
115. See, e.g., Proposed Resolution from Judge Walter Ely (June 10, 1969), in WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 594 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014). On the Judicial
Conference, see 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
116. S. 1506, 91st Cong. (1969).
117. Id.
118. Memorandum from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to the Court (Oct., 1969), in
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 594 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014). The
Memorandum was never published, presumably because the proposed rules were never
adopted by the Court.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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which the judge served as a compensated officer or consultant.1 2 3 The bill
also required judges to list their real and personal property interests valued
at more than $10,000 and all trusts valued at more than $ 10,000.124 Finally,
the bill required judges to list all financial liabilities, such as home loans and
lines of credit valued at more than $5,000.125 Ostensibly, this bill was
introduced as a means to build public confidence in the impartiality of federal
judges following Justice Fortas's resignation.1 26
When the Judicial Conference rescinded the proposed prohibition
against judges earning outside income, Representative Taft, along with Ford,
formally requested that Representative Celler, as Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, schedule a hearing on the bill.1 2 7 Celler remained
noncommittal,1 28 and Taft grew frustrated at the inability to move the bill
forward. He complained to a University of Cincinnati Law School professor
that he "saw no reason why a thorough investigation of such conflicts of
interest should not be carried out," adding that Ford was in the process of
123. H.R. 11109, 91st Cong. § 470(a) (1969); see also Letter from Representative Robert
Taft, Jr. to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary
Comm. (May 26, 1969), in ROBERT TAFT, JR. PAPERS, 1897-1993, Box 44 (Library of Cong.
comp., 2009). Taft wrote:
As you know, on May 8, the Honorable Gerald Ford and I introduced H.R. 11109,
to provide for financial disclosure by members of the Federal judiciary. In view of
recent developments, I feel the Committee should consider whether it would be
appropriate at this time to schedule hearings on this proposal. In making this request
I recognize, of course, the recent call by the Chief Justice for action by the Judicial
Conference, as well as the constitutional questions involved.
Letter from Representative Robert Taft, Jr., supra. Ford wrote separately to Celler on May
28, stating, "Honorable Robert Taft, Jr., and I have introduced H.R. 11109, to provide for
financial disclosure by members of the Federal judiciary. This legislation has been referred
to your committee and I would very much appreciate anything which you may do to schedule
hearings on the proposal." Letter from Representative Gerald Ford to Representative
Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (May 28, 1969), in
ROBERT TAFT, JR. PAPERS, 1897-1993, Box 44 (Library of Cong. comp., 2009).
124. H.R. 11109 §§ 470(b)-(c).
125. Id. § 470(e).
126. Statement by Representative Robert Taft, Jr., On the Resignation of Supreme Court
Justice Abe Fortas (May 15, 1969) in ROBERT TAFT, JR. PAPERS, 1897-1993, Vault 0202B,
(Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
127. Letter from Representative Robert Taft, Jr. to Representative Emanuel Celler,
Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 4, 1969), in ROBERT TAFT, JR.
PAPERS, 1897-1993, Vault 0202B, (Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
128. Letter from Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives
Judiciary Comm., to Representative Robert Taft, Jr. (Nov. 7, 1969), in ROBERT TAFT, JR.
PAPERS, 1897-1993, Vault 0202B, (Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
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investigating "at least one member of the Court."1 2 9 Four days later, Ford
publicly "hinted" that he was going to demand an investigation into Justice
Douglas.' 30 Three days after issuing his "hint," Ford expanded on his
statements and added that he had begun to study Justice Douglas's financial
relationships early in the year and that this information would form the basis
for his eventual demand to have Justice Douglas investigated by the
House.131 Later in the month, Ford informed several congressmen that he
would call for a special investigation into Justice Douglas by the end of
1970. 132
The Warren Court's opinions ending segregation, limiting school
prayer, and extending the rights of the accused had drawn staunch criticism
from southern conservatives. The failed confirmation of Justice Fortas for
chief justice, investigation into his conflicts of interest, and subsequent
resignation from the Court gave members of Congress and the press good
cause to look at other justices with skepticism. And, when Senate Democrats
failed to confirm Nixon's first two appointments to replace Justice Fortas,
political motivation to unseat another vulnerable Supreme Court justice
grew; the political climate seemed ripe for a call for impeachment. Justice
Douglas looked to be the ideal target. His personal life did not live up to
expected standards of conservative family values. His judicial decisions
gave Republicans an opening to criticize him for undermining the war effort.
And, his extrajudicial writings and activities allowed them to paint him as a
subversive who would continue to undermine national security.
II. FORD'S CALL FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF JUSTICE DOUGLAS
Throughout the 1960's, congressional criticism of the justices had
largely focused on ethical concerns regarding conflicts of interest and the
justices' finances. There were no specific allegations that Justice Douglas
had undermined national security until April 9, 1970, when Vice President
Spiro Agnew, in a CBS News interview, alleged that Justice Douglas had
expressed beliefs that were incompatible with the nation's security.1 3 3 In the
129. Letter from Representative Robert Taft, Jr. to C.M. Hulley, Professor, Univ. of
Cincinnati Law School (Dec. 5, 1969), in ROBERT TAFT, JR. PAPERS, 1897-1993, Vault
0202B, (Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
130. Fred P. Graham, Ford Hints Move to Oust Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1969, at 1.
131. Contempt of Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1969.
132. See Rep. Ford Says He Pushes Study ofJustice Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22 1969;
Spencer Rich, Ford Eyes Ousting Douglas, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1969, at Al; Royce Brier,
Douglas Hostage For Haynsworth?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 1969.
133. Letter from Herbert L. Thompson to White House Staff (Apr. 10, 1970), in SPIRo
AGNEW PAPERS, 1953-1977, Box 18 (Univ. Md. comp., 2008). A transcript of the interview
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interview, Agnew asserted that Justice Douglas's extrajudicial writings
advocated rebellion against the United States government and alluded to "the
fact that two fine judges [had] been denied seats on the bench for
statements . . .much less reprehensible .... 134 Agnew's interview
appeared to prime the public for the information that Ford provided when he
laid out his claims against Justice Douglas and called for his impeachment
just a few days later. This Part analyzes both the generalized and specific
claims made by Ford, as well as the congressional response to those claims.
When Ford detailed his allegations to the House of Representatives on
April 15, 1970, he claimed that he had received hundreds of complaints about
Justice Douglas, which led him to "quietly [undertake] a study of both the
law of impeachment and the facts about the behavior of Mr. Justice
Douglas."1 35  Ford articulated several complaints before specifying his
charges against Douglas: that Congressman Taft's bill had remained
"dormant" in the Judiciary Committee; that the Judicial Conference's newly
promulgated ethics rules did not apply to the Supreme Court; and that the
thirty-six-year-old canons of judicial ethics were merely advisory for the
federal judiciary.1 36 Ford also tried to reassure the House that he had not
moved against Justice Douglas on the basis of the justice's jurisprudential
philosophy or any personal animus against him.1 3 7 And, unlike the prior
Southern Democrat-led efforts, Ford noted that he did not incorporate Justice
Douglas's three divorces into his reasons for seeking an investigation.1 38
was attached to Thompson's letter, which was forwarded to H.R. Haldeman, C. Stanley Blair,
Herbert G Klein, and Ronald Zeigler. In the interview, Mr. Agnew was asked what position
the administration would take if Ford did begin impeachment proceedings against Justice
Douglas. Id. The Vice-President answered:
I must say in complete candor that having read the latest publication of Justice
Douglas' I'm a little bit concerned about his qualifications. I think that if we are
talking about qualifications of Supreme Court Justices, it may be appropriate to look
at some of his beliefs, among which, as I recall is a statement that rebellion is
justified, in cases where the establishment has acted in the way it's acting at the
present time. It seems rather unusual for a man on the bench to advocate rebellion
and revolution. And possibly, we should take a better look at what the justice is
saying and what he thinks, particularly in view of the fact two fine judges have been
denied seats on the bench for statements that are much less reprehensible than those
made by, in my opinion, by Justice Douglas."
Id.
134. Id.
135. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Congressman Matson Emmitt O'Neal introduced the previous resolution calling
for an investigation in 1966; the formal title read: "To conduct a full and complete
investigation and study of the moral character of Justice William 0 Douglas, in view of the
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Ford reminded the House that federal judges did not constitutionally
serve in their offices for life, but rather remained on the bench only during
periods of "good behavior."'39 He conceded that the term "good behavior"
found in Article III was no different than the language accompanying the
terms of office for federal legislators found in Article 1.140 He failed to
articulate a clear standard for what constituted an impeachable offense;
instead of a finite standard, he claimed that "an impeachable offense [was]
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives consider[ed] it to be at
a moment in history .... "141 In his view, an impeachable offense was
whatever "two-thirds of the [Senate] consider[ed] to be sufficiently serious
to require removal of the accused from office."1 4 2 He also insisted that
federal judges had to be held to a higher standard than elected officials
because, unlike congressmen or presidents, voters could not remove them
through the electoral process.1 43  Whether intended or not, Ford's loose
standard was tailor-made to an allegation that Justice Douglas had
undermined national security. During times of crisis, opposition speech is
often deemed to "aid the enemy" in an effort to silence it. 144 The loose
standard of "good behavior" advanced by Ford could allow Congress to find
an impeachable offense in a justice's opposition speech simply because it
went against the grain of current political opinion.
A. Justice Douglas's Failure to Recuse
After giving his opinions on the nature ofjudicial tenure, Ford went on
to provide his reasons why Justice Douglas should face an impeachment
hearing. The minority leader's first accusation was that Justice Douglas's
fact that he has been divorced by three wives on grounds of alleged cruelty, including in the
case of one wife, alleged personal indignities." See H.R. Res. 928, 89th Cong. (1966) (calling
for the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate Douglas). Of course, by mentioning the
prior efforts of Southern congressmen to impeach Justice Douglas, Ford may have intended
to remind Congress that Justice Douglas's "immorality" would still form a basis to judge his
competency to remain on the Court.
139. Ford Speech, supra note 1.
140. Id In his efforts to define "good behavior" and "impeachable offenses," he took
pains to separate the constitutional impeachment provisions from British practice. Id
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id Ford noted that in its history, the House had impeached nine federal judges, of
which the Senate convicted four. Id. Ford further harkened to the impeachment of Judge
Halsted Ritter in 1936. In that impeachment-which Ford characterized as political-the
House found Ritter forced litigants to channel their monies to his former law partner and
practiced law while serving as a judge. However, the Senate acquitted him on the specific
charges and convicted him on an omnibus charge. See GERHARDT, supra note 69, at 54.
144. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 1-14 (2004).
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association with Ralph Ginzburg created a two-fold conflict.1 4 5  Justice
Douglas had written an article that was printed in one of Ginzburg's
publications and was paid $350 for it.1 4 6 Ginzburg was later found guilty of
violating a federal obscenity statute by sending a magazine titled "Eros"
through the mail. 14' The Court upheld the conviction, but Justice Douglas,
along with Justices Black, Stewart, and Harlan, dissented,148 prompting
several senators to voice opposition to the Court's overturning of obscenity
statutes during the Senate's investigation into Justice Fortas. 149 Another
Ginzburg magazine had attacked Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican
presidential candidate, and Goldwater had successfully sued Ginzberg for
libel.15 0 When the Court issued its decision not to grant certiorari, thereby
upholding the libel award, Justice Douglas dissented. '5  Ford claimed that
Justice Douglas should have recused himself from each decision, even if the
article was only a praise of folk music, for which he received only nominal
compensation 5 2  It was improper, irrespective of the payment, that the
Justice's image appeared in a full-page photo with the "byline clear across
the page reading 'By William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court,"' in a publication which, at the time, had two appeals pending before
145. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,915.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
148. See id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting). Although Justice Douglas joined in Justice
Black's dissent, he also separately dissented. Id. at 482 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the federal obscenity statute under which Ginzburg had been prosecuted could not apply to
the very instances which Ginzburg's magazines displayed). Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Black in his dissent, pointed out that the trial court found that an article on interracial sex was
obscene, as well as an article detailing sexual intercourse and orgasms from a woman's point
of view. Id. at 488. Moreover, an article on homosexuality served as a basis for a conviction.
Id. at 490. Justice Douglas concluded his dissent with the admonition:
[U]nder our charter all regulation or control of expression is barred. Government
does not sit to reveal where the "truth" is. People are left to pick and choose
between competing offerings. There is no compulsion to take and read what is
repulsive any more than there is to spend one's time poring over government
bulletins, political tracts, or theological treatises.... I think this is the ideal of the
Free Society written into our Constitution. We have no business acting as censors
or endowing any group with censorship powers.
Id. at 492.
149. MURPHY, supra note 15, at 441-62.
150. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049
(1970).
151. Goldwater, 396 U.S. at 1049 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Robert H. Phelps,
Court Allows Goldwater Judgment to Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1970.
152. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,915. Ford recognized that Justice Douglas's article
was also not pornographic, but he characterized it as "prais[ing] the lusty, lurid, and risqu6
along with the social protest of leftwing folk singers." Id.
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the Court.'5 3 He reminded the House that federal law required a judge to
recuse himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his
attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial,
appeal, or other proceeding therein.1 54
In this instance, Ford arguably overreached because Justice Douglas did
not have a financial stake in the outcome of Ginzburg's appeals. But, linking
Justice Douglas to a purveyor of material that conservatives considered
obscene added to their argument that Justice Douglas contributed to the
destabilization of society.
B. Justice Douglas's Writings Allegedly Advocating Rebellion
Ford next turned to the first of several allegations that Justice Douglas
undermined national security. Justice Douglas had recently published Points
of Rebellion, in which he posited that the nation's freedom was at risk
because of an overarching military industrial complex and governmental
surveillance of both individuals protesting the Vietnam Conflict and civil
rights organizations.15 5 Ford relied on the article as evidence that Justice
Douglas was advocating rebellion. He said the article had championed the
idea that, just as there had been a right to rebel against the British crown
during the War for Independence, there was now a right to rebel against the
United States government if it did not curtail its expanding interference into
the lives of Americans.1 56 Ford said that Justice Douglas had condoned
violence against the government and would have to recuse himself from
cases arising from challenges to the government's military and national
security policies. 1
Ford also used Points of Rebellion to again tie Justice Douglas to
Ginzburg's controversial publications. Justice Douglas had allowed excerpts
from Points of Rebellion to be reprinted in Evergreen-another Ginzburg-
owned magazine that Ford claimed contained a "hybrid of hippie-yippie"
diatribes against the government and pornography. Ford argued that by
153. Id. Ford said: "Writing signed articles for notorious publications of a convicted
pornographer is bad enough. Taking money from them is worse. Declining to disqualify
one's self in [the] case is inexcusable." Id.
154. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012)). Ford claimed that it was "inexcusable" for Justice
Douglas not to have recused himself in light of this law. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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allowing the excerpts to be reprinted, Justice Douglas condoned the
magazine's other articles that encouraged violence.15
C. Justice Douglas's Involvement with the Parvin Foundation
Toward the end of his speech, Ford accused Justice Douglas of
nefariously "consorting" with "Albert Parvin and [his] mysterious entity
known as the Parvin Foundation." 5 9 Ford implied that Justice Douglas's
involvement in the foundation had undermined national security in at least
two ways. First, Ford implied that Parvin was a member of the criminal
underworld. 60 Second, he claimed that, through his involvement with the
foundation, Douglas had undermined the war effort against Northern
Vietnam and the South Vietnamese communists.161
1. Parvin, Justice Douglas, and the Criminal Underworld
Ford asserted that Parvin was associated with suspected mafiosi
Sanford Adler, Gus Greenbaum, and William Siegel.1 62 He claimed that
Parvin had paid one well-known mafioso, Meyer Lansky, a $200,000
finder's fee when Parvin sold a Las Vegas casino known as the Flamingo.1 63
The difficulty with Ford's accusation against Parvin was that it was not
uncommon for such "fees" to be paid to the mafia in Las Vegas; billionaire
Howard Hughes had also paid "fees" to gangsters for the purchase of his Las
Vegas casinos.1 6 4  In the late 1960s, alleged mafiosi who "controlled"
Nevada's casinos had been looking for a means to divest their ownership out
158. Id. Ford exhorted Congress, "[Y]ou cannot tell me that an Associate Justice of the
United States is compelled to give his permission to reprint his name and his title and his
writings in a pornographic magazine with a portfolio of obscene photographs on one side of
it and a literary admonition to get a gun and start shooting at the first white face you see on
the other." Id.
159. Id. at 11,916.
160. Id. Ford alluded to Albert Parvin's questionable past dealings with spurious business
partners. Id. Parvin became the part owner of the Hotel Flamingo, a hotel and casino in Las
Vegas. Id The hotel's original partner, Bugsy Siegel, was murdered soon afterward. Id
Sanford Adler then took over running the establishment, and when he later fled to Mexico to
avoid income tax charges, the hotel passed to Gus Greenbaum. Id Greenbaum fled to Cuba
only a day later, where he was later murdered. Id. After Siegel, Adler, and Greenbaum "left"
the establishment, Parvin teamed up with William Israel Alderman to run the Flamingo. Id
However, this relationship was short-lived, as well, because Alderman soon after left for the
Riviera. Id Parvin was then left running the Flamingo by himself. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. CRIME, ADDICTION, AND THE REGULATIONS OF GAMBLNG 35-37 (Toine Spapens et
al. eds., 2008).
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of a fear that the Justice Department had learned of tax-skimming
schemes.1 65
Ford also tied Justice Douglas to two men with felony records: Robert
"Bobby" Baker and Edward Levinson.1 6 6  Baker, a prot6g6 of Lyndon
Johnson, was under investigation for fraud and for having ties to organized
crime.1 6 7 From 1954 until 1963, Baker was also a de facto secretary to
Johnson and Mike Mansfield when they were senate majority leaders.1 68
Ford reminded Congress that Justice Fortas had represented Baker's vending
machine company prior to his Supreme Court appointment.1 69 Levinson also
had ties to organized crime through his ownership of the Sands Casino and
as director of the Flamingo Casino in Las Vegas.17 0 Because Parvin had
financial dealings with both Levinson and Baker, Ford used him to tie Justice
Douglas to the two.
2. Parvin, Justice Douglas, and Communism
Ford then used the tie to Baker and Levinson to assert that Justice
Douglas had supported communist forces in Central America. Ford alleged
that Baker and Justice Douglas stayed at Levinson's hotel together and Baker
later met with Juan Bosch, the deposed leader of the Dominican Republic, to
convey Justice Douglas's support for his return to power.1 7 2 Although Ford
did not directly accuse either Baker or Justice Douglas of trying to open the
Dominican Republic to organized crime, he implied that the purpose of
Baker's meeting with Bosch was to obtain a license to open a casino and that
Douglas had helped him do so.1 73 At any rate, Ford could only speculate as
to what Bosch might have conceded to the gambling industry. If Justice
165. Sergio Lalli, Howard Hughes in Vegas, in THE PLAYERS: THE MEN WHO MADE LAS
VEGAS 133, 133-57 (Jack Sheehan ed., 1997).
166. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,916.
167. See ROBERT DALLEK, LONE STAR RISING 477-78 (1991).
168. NEIL MACNEIL & RICHARD A. BAKER, THE AMERICAN SENATE 36-37 (2013); ROBERT
CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER 164 (2012).
169. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,917.
170. See ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL 67 (1992).
171. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,917. Ford also reminded Congress that between
1966 and 1969, Parvin took over the Aladdin Hotel, Fremont Hotel, and Stardust Hotel before
the Securities and Exchange Commission audited him. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. It is true that organized crime leaders dominated the casino industry in Cuba in
the 1950s and, after the communist takeover of that nation, explored the possibility of other
Caribbean locations. But, any attempt to link organized crime to Bosch was problematic
since, like Fidel Castro, Bosch intended to nationalize much of the Dominican Republic's
economy, including its hotels and casinos. Ford either was unaware or ignored this aspect of
Bosch's platform.
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Douglas had met with Baker and Bosch, as Ford suspected, one could infer
that Ford thought Justice Douglas likely interfered with the foreign policy of
the United States, as well, particularly since neither the Kennedy nor Johnson
administrations backed Bosch's presidency in 1962 or his attempt to return
to power in 1965.174 However, there was no evidence that Baker and Justice
Douglas were in Las Vegas for a shared purpose-the investigation later
uncovered that Justice Douglas and Baker were not even in Las Vegas at the
same time-and there was no evidence of any correspondence between the
two men regarding the Dominican Republic. 7 5
Ford also claimed that Justice Douglas's involvement in the Parvin
Foundation had undermined national security by supporting communist
regimes because, although "[t]he ostensible purpose of the Parvin
Foundation was declared to be educating the developing leadership in Latin
America," the true reason for the foundation was to protect mafia casino
interests in Cuba during the communist revolution.1 7 6 In 1961, Justice
Douglas was named to the foundation's board and received a stipend-Ford
called it "pay"-which lasted until 1969, when Justice Douglas voluntarily
relinquished all payments following Justice Fortas's resignation.17 7 Ford
claimed Baker, Parvin, and Justice Douglas welcomed Bosch when he
returned from exile to become the Dominican Republic's president. '7  But,
Ford had to concede that Senator Hubert Humphrey and First Lady Johnson
also attended in a formal capacity. 179 Ford emphasized that Justice Douglas's
resignation from the Parvin Foundation following Justice Fortas's departure
from the Court constituted direct evidence that Justice Douglas knew his
association with the foundation violated judicial ethics.so
Douglas had a relationship with another center focusing on
international relations-the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
("CSDI").'8' This center, overseen by Dr. Robert Hutchins, the former dean
of the Yale University Law School, also obtained funding from Parvin.182
Ford tried to portray the center as an adjunct to the Parvin Foundation and a
174. Id. On the Kennedy and Johnson view of Bosch, see Russell D. Buhite, From
Kennedy to Nixon:The End of Consensus, in AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS RECONSIDERED:
1890-1993, at 131 (Gordon Martel ed., 1994).
175. CHARNS, supra note 170, at 115.
176. See Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,916.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 11,917.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 11,918.
182. Id.
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link to Meyer Lansky.'83 He also informed the House that, in 1967, CSDI
had held a "conference of militant student leaders [where] plans were laid
for violent campus disruptions . . . and the students were exhorted . . . to
sabotage American society, block defense work by universities, immobilize
computerized record systems and discredit the ROTC."18 4 Ford claimed that
CSDI, through its participation in an international conference, encouraged
left-wing rebellions in Latin America and Asia.'s In this latter category,
Ford's allies would later hint at a relationship between Ho Chi Minh and
Douglas.18 6
Toward the end of his speech, Ford reiterated that Douglas had aligned
with a combination of organized criminals, left-wing campus radicals, and
other persons whose interests ran contrary to the United States.1 7 Finally,
Ford attempted to create an aura of guilt by association between Justices
Fortas and Douglas because Justice Fortas had been one of Justice Douglas's
prized pupils at Yale.' In comparing the two Justices, Ford concluded by
charging Justice Douglas with violations of judicial ethics rules far beyond
Justice Fortas's transgressions. 8 9 Although this Article is focused on Ford's
(and ostensibly Nixon's) efforts to portray Justice Douglas as a danger to
national security, it cannot be ignored that the diversity of allegations against
Douglas would have appeared illogical if considered as interrelated-unless,
of course, Ford intended to present Justice Douglas as an unstable
Manchurian candidate.
183. Id. Ford included in his remarks an assertion that Lansky had been paid $25,000 per
year during the same time that the center was making payments to Justice Douglas. Id
184. Id.
185. Id. Ford said that CSDI had "sponsored and financed the National Conference for
New Politics which was, in effect, the birth of the New Left as a political movement." Id
186. See CONG. REC. 11,920 (1970) (statement of Rep. Louis C. Wyman). Perhaps
because the first Pacem in Terris conference occurred in New York in 1965 in full public
view, it seems not to have caused concern to Johnson's administration.
187. Ford Speech, supra note 1, at 11,919.
188. Id.
189. Id. Ford acknowledged there was no evidence that Wolfson had ties to the criminal
underworld, but he also said that the situation with Justice Fortas was different because
Mr. Justice Fortas had enough respect for the so-called establishment and the
personal decency to resign when his behavior brought reproach upon the U.S.
Supreme Court. Whatever he may have done privately, Mr. Justice Fortas did not
consistently take public positions that damaged and endangered the fabric of law
and government.
Id.
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D. Congressional Reaction: Ford's Allies
Congressman Joseph D. Waggonner, a conservative pro-segregationist
Louisiana Democrat, took the podium after Ford and reminded the House of
Representatives that, in 1966, he had introduced a resolution seeking an
investigation into Justice Douglas.' 90 In his short statement, Waggonner
seconded Ford's allegations and, in particular, emphasized an alleged link
between Justice Douglas and the "pornographic" publications of
Ginzburg.' 9' He also mentioned a link between Justice Douglas, Lansky,
and the "radical Hutchins."1 92 Waggonner's speech was brief, but his main
point was a meritless interpretation of the judicial system. Waggonner
argued that Justice Douglas's "least whim, his most causal aberration can
suddenly, for all intents, become the law of the land."' 93 This claim lacked
any efficacy for the most obvious of reasons: Justice Douglas was only one
of nine justices, and the idea that the Court's most liberal and iconoclastic
justice could sway Justices Burger, Harlan, Stewart, White, or the newly
arrived Blackmun stretched credulity.1 94
While Waggonner's statements may not have undermined Ford, a
misjudgment on the part of Congressman Louis C. Wyman, one of Ford's
staunchest allies and a longtime critic of Justice Douglas, shifted the
momentum in the House away from creating a special ad hoc investigation
in the Rules Committee to an investigation headed by the Judiciary
Committee. Wyman, a conservative New Hampshire Republican, was a
states-rights congressman, and he had a personal reason for taking part in the
impeachment efforts. 195 While serving as New Hampshire's attorney general
in 1951, he convinced the legislature to pass a statute banning subversive
persons from holding state government positions.1 96 The law gave him, as
190. 116 CONG. REc. 11,919 (1970) (statement of Rep. Joe D. Waggonner). First elected
to Congress in 1960, Waggonner opposed civil rights and supported the United States'
involvement in Vietnam. In 1974, he fought against Nixon's impeachment. Indeed, after
Nixon resigned, Waggonner continued to profess the former president's innocence. See
DAVID WAYNE CHILDS, CONGRESSMAN JOE D. WAGGONER: A STUDY IN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
119-30 (1979). In 1976, Waggonner was arrested for soliciting a prostitute. RONALD
KESSLER, INSIDE CONGRESS 21 (1997).
191. 116 CONG. REC. 11,919 (1970) (statement of Rep. Joe D. Waggonner).
192. Id. Ford associated Hutchins with "intellectual incubators for the New Left and the
[Students for a Democratic Society]." Id.
193. Id. at 11,920.
194. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 425-33 (2010).
195. See generally FREEDOM WRITER: VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR, LETTERS FROM THE CIVIL
RIGHTS YEARS 157 (Patricia Sullivan ed., 2003).
196. Act Relative to Subversive Activities, 1951 N.H. Laws 410.
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attorney general, the power to investigate persons suspected of ties to the
Communist Party of the United States.1 9 7  In 1957, the Supreme Court
reversed a state conviction of a professor whom Wyman investigated.' 98 The
professor, citing the First Amendment, refused to answer Wyman's
interrogations, and a state judge imprisoned the professor for contempt.1 99
The Court overturned the contempt conviction.2 00
But, Wyman did not always lose in the Court. Two years later, the
Court upheld a civil contempt order against Willard Uphaus, a person
Wyman suspected of communist ties, after Uphaus refused to provide
Wyman the names of people who attended a summer camp sponsored by the
World Fellowship.20 ' While Justice Douglas was in the majority that
reversed the contempt conviction against the professor, he joined the dissent
against Wyman in the second case.202 In 1957, Wyman addressed the
Georgia state legislature and claimed that Justice Douglas showed partiality
to subversive organizations through the two decisions. 2 03
Wyman planned to make a statement and propose a House resolution
that called for an investigation into Justice Douglas.204 But, after Speaker
McCormack recognized Wyman to deliver his statement, Congressman
Andrew Jacobs, an Indiana Democrat, asked Wyman to yield for "a three-
sentence statement." 20 5 Wyman, perhaps assuming that Jacobs only sought
a point of order, yielded the floor to Jacobs.20 6 That misjudgment allowed
197. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN
CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY 156 (1999).
198. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 248. The Court specifically criticized Wyman:
The nature of the investigation which the Attorney General was authorized to
conduct is revealed by this case. He delved minutely into the past conduct of
petitioner, thereby making his private life a matter of public record. The
questioning indicates that the investigators had thoroughly prepared for the
interview and were not acquiring new information as much as corroborating data
already in their possession. On the great majority of questions, the witness was
cooperative, even though he made clear his opinion that the interrogation was
unjustified and unconstitutional. Two subjects arose upon which petitioner refused
to answer: his lectures at the University of New Hampshire, and his knowledge of
the Progressive Party and its adherents."
Id.
199. Id. at 239-45.
200. Id. at 255.
201. Uphaus v Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81 (1959).
202. Id. at 82-108 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. M. J. HEALE, MCCARTHY's AMERICANS 264 (1998).
204. See H.R. Res. 922, 91st Cong. (1970).
205. 116 CONG. REC. 11,920 (1970).
206. Id.
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Jacobs in three sentences to beat Wyman to the punch and introduce the first
House resolution calling for an investigation of Douglas by the Judiciary
Committee.207
There was a fundamental difference between the two proposals:
Jacobs's proposal-listed as H.R. Res. 920-would place the investigation
in the hands of the Judiciary Committee; Wyman's proposal that Jacobs
preempted-listed as H.R. Res. 922-sought to place the investigation in the
House of Representatives Rules Committee.208 Wyman's misstep meant that
instead of having the charges against Justice Douglas investigated by the
Rules Committee-where Ford and his coalition could exert more control
over the investigation-the charges would be investigated by the Judiciary
Committee and controlled by Celler, who could appoint any Democrat he
wanted.209
E. Attempts to Create a Special Investigation Bypassing the Judiciary
Committee
Within four days of Ford's call to investigate Justice Douglas, fifty-
three Democrats joined fifty-one Republicans to sign on to Jacobs's
resolution that authorized an investigation by the Judiciary Committee. 2 10
Ford and his allies were determined not to allow the investigation to proceed
in the hands of the Judiciary Committee, though. A special investigative
committee headed by the Rules Committee was more likely to result in
articles of impeachment being drafted and passed to the full House for a vote;
the Rules Committee could have simply adopted the ad hoc investigation's
findings and then voted on articles of impeachment without further debate. 2 11
This course of action would have constituted a significant departure from
more than a century of precedent in which the Judiciary Committee had been
responsible for such investigations, but Ford and his allies were determined
to try.212
207. Id. Jacobs claimed Ford had refused to file a resolution of impeachment requiring a
formal investigation, and that he would, therefore, immediately introduce the resolution "in
order that a proper and dignified inquiry" into the matter be held. Id.
208. See id.
209. See supra Section I.C.
210. H.R. Res. 920, 91st Cong. (1970). A total of ten resolutions that called for an
investigation into Douglas were filed. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. REs. 920, 91ST CONG.,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: FIRST REPORT 4 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter
INTERIM REPORT].
211. See infra Part IV.
212. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 374
(1981); NELSON W. POLSBY, How CONGRESS EVOLVEs 35 (2004).
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Wyman introduced a resolution that asked the Speaker of the House to
appoint a special subcommittee comprised of six congressmen, with both
parties evenly represented, to investigate the charges. 213 A co-sponsor of the
resolution, Maston Emmitt O'Neal, claimed that Justice Douglas was a threat
to national security, writing: "In my opinion, Justice Douglas is an evil man
and one of the most dangerous in America. His behavior has been far from
'good' as required by the Constitution, and I think he should go to trial for
it."214
William Colmer, a conservative Southern Democrat, chaired the Rules
Committee. 215  Although Ford had once claimed his intent to distance
conservative Republicans from Southern Democrats, he knew he would need
to convince Colmer on the merits of having the Rules Committee lead the
investigation if he was going to succeed in orchestrating the investigation he
desired.216 Colmer was a World War I veteran and a supporter of the United
States' involvement in Vietnam. He had been in Congress since 1933, and,
like Hebert, he signed the "Southern Manifesto," disparaged the Warren
Court after Brown, and articulated that the southern states constituted "the
real America." 2 17  In this vein, Colmer had also equated anti-war
demonstrators with communism. 218 Ford saw a clear path to convincing
Colmer of the importance of impeaching Justice Douglas and of having his
own committee control the investigation-by appealing to his concerns
about national security.
In the year preceding Ford's speech, Colmer appointed a "study group"
to examine potential changes in the House and Senate committees. 2 19 The
group was charged with exploring (1) alterations to the relationships between
committees and House leadership; (2) increasing the number of joint
committees with the Senate; and (3) granting the Rules Committee the power
213. H.R. Res. 924, 91st Cong. (1970). Rep. Maston Emmitt O'Neal, who co-sponsored
the resolution, told a constituent that he intended to bypass Celler's committee to keep New
York Democrats from controlling the investigation. See Letter from Representative Maston
O'Neal to Mrs. Eugene C. Black (Apr. 17, 1970), in MASTON O'NEAL PAPERS, 1962-1972,
Collection 850, Box 43 (Richard B. Russell Library, Univ. Georgia comp., 2008).
214. Letter from Representative Maston O'Neal to Mrs. Eugene C. Black, supra note 213.
215. DONALD R. WOLFENSBERGER, CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE 94 (2000).
216. See, e.g., John F. Manley, The Conservative Coalition in Congress, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 97, 98-114 (Robert L. Peabody & Nelson
W. Polsby eds., 3d ed. 1977). Manley noted that, in 1967, Ford publicly proclaimed that
conservative Republicans would no longer openly ally with Southern Democrats. Id at 105.
217. RANDOLPH HOHLE, RACE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NEOLIBERALISM 198
(2015).
218. Id.; ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT 83 (2015); JASON MORGAN WARD,
DEFENDING WHITE DEMOCRACY 25 (2011).
219. WOLFENSBERGER, supra note 215.
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to conduct extra-congressional investigations. 2 20 Following the study, he
introduced a bill that would have given the Rules Committee that power.2 2 1
For over a year, a McCormack-led coalition of northern and western
Democrats and liberal Republicans blocked Colmer's efforts to expand his
committee's authority.222 While Colmer's purpose appears to have had little
directly to do with the Supreme Court, the timing of his effort and possible
impact on any investigation into Douglas should not be ignored.
Ultimately, Colmer announced that he would not pursue an
investigation against Douglas through the Rules Committee. 223 He claimed
that Wyman's resolution authorized "only a study and recommendation" by
the Rules Committee, such that the Judiciary Committee was the more
appropriate body to conduct the investigation.224 In other words, Colmer-
who would likely have voted to impeach Douglas-claimed that his
committee could not be used as a means to draft impeachment articles.
III. THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
Having gained Colmer's promise to postpone Ford's efforts to use the
Rules Committee, Celler formed the investigating subcommittee by selecting
Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat, and Byron Rogers, a Colorado Democrat.225
Celler promised the public that the investigation would be "neither a
whitewash [of Justice Douglas] nor a witchhunt." 22 6
Brooks was a liberal who had supported President Johnson's domestic
policies.22 7 Byron Rogers served in the Army in World War I and, after the
220. See id.
221. Id On June 17, 1970, Colmer brought H.R. 17654, The Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970, to the floor of the House for a vote. Id
222. See id at 93.
223. See Douglas Resolution Deferred, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, April 24, 1970, at 2A.
Representative Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., played an important role in swaying Colmer from
inserting the Rules Committee into the investigation of Douglas. Letter from Representative
Thomas O'Neill, Jr., to John E. Thayer (June 17, 1970), in THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.
CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS, 1936-1994 (John J. Burns Library, Boston Coll. comp., 1988)
(describing Celler as "an extremely fair man who is greatly concerned with civil liberties" and
suggesting that an investigation conducted by the Rules Committee would have been biased
against Douglas); see also Martin F. Nolan, The Man Who Could Push Richard Nixon Over
the Edge, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 24, 1973, at 39.
224. Douglas Resolution Deferred, supra note 223.
225. Marjorie Hunter, Celler Will Head Panel on Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1970, at
1.
226. Id
227. See SEAN P. CUNNINGHAM, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR SUNBELT 95 (2014)
(noting that Brooks voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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war, began a career in state politics, including a stint as Colorado's attorney
general.228 In 1950, Denver's voters elected him to Congress, where he
served ten consecutive terms. 22 9 Rogers, like Celler and Brooks, supported
civil rights, and, in response to a firebomb attack on the NAACP
headquarters in Mississippi in 1967, pushed for legislation to federalize law
enforcement throughout that state.23 0 Although Rogers had never been a
public supporter of the escalation of force in Vietnam, he also had not
opposed it.2 31
William M. McCulloch, the ranking Republican on the Judiciary
Committee, and Edward Hutchinson, a Michigan Republican, were also
appointed to the subcommittee.2 32 Although Ford lobbied McCulloch to
persuade Celler to appoint Hutchinson, there is nothing in either Ford's or
McCulloch's papers that indicates Ford's lobbying was persuasive. 233 Ford
may have believed that McCulloch would push for the House to draft articles
of impeachment because McCulloch had proved himself to be a stalwart
conservative and a "hawk" on national security matters. But, McCulloch
could also be wholly independent of his party.234 If Nixon and Ford were
able to garner McCulloch's vote in favor of impeachment, it would send a
powerful signal to the nation that Justice Douglas's support for civil rights
had not been a basis for impeachment.
A. Formulating the Charges Against Justice Douglas
Most of the charges in H.R. Res. 920 accused Justice Douglas of
abandoning his duty of impartiality and accepting monies in violation of
established law.235 However, one charge accused Justice Douglas of
undermining confidence in the federal government by publishing Points of
228. See Rogers, Byron Giles, (1900-1983), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG.,
https://perma.cc/7XQT-23YZ.
229. Id.
230. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 221 (1987).
231. See ALAN WARE, THE LOGIC OF PARTY DEMOCRACY 94 (1979); JOAN A. Lowy, PAT
SCHROEDER: A WOMAN OF THE HOUSE 30 (2003).
232. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. REs. 920, 91ST CONG., ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS: FINAL REPORT iii (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter REPORT 11].
233. See Press Release, Office of Congressman Edward Hutchinson (Apr. 21, 1970), in
EDWARD HUTCHINSON PAPERS, 1959-1976, Box 14 (Gerald R. Ford Library, William McNitt
comp., 1989); Letter from Howard W. Fogt, Jr., Minority Counsel to Representative Edward
Hutchinson (May 19, 1970), in EDWARD HUTCHINSON PAPERS, 1959-1976, Box 14 (Gerald
R. Ford Library, William McNitt comp., 1989).
234. See CARL ALBERT WITH DANNEY GOBLE, LITTLE GIANT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
SPEAKER CARL ALBERT 278 (1990).
235. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 31-69.
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Rebellion.2 3 6 A further charge involved an article Douglas authored titled
"Redress and Revolution" in Evergreen Magazine, which likewise was
allegedly designed to erode confidence in the government.23 7 Another
charge was that Justice Douglas was responsible for student unrest because
he served as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the CSDI and that
organization had sought relations with the Soviet Union and stoked campus
unrest.2 3 8 A separate charge involving Justice Douglas and the CSDI claimed
that he had tried to communicate with Ho Chi Minh without presidential
sanction during a 1967 international conference in Geneva titled Pacem in
Terris I.239 Justice Douglas was also accused of undermining national
security by openly advocating for the "recognition of Red China" and by
publicly criticizing the government's foreign policy while on a trip to
Brazil.240 In regard to Justice Douglas's position in the Parvin Foundation,
H.R. Res. 922 contained charges that he had consorted with "gangsters" and
had tried to reestablish "the leftist" Juan Bosch as president of the Dominican
Republic. 241
In addition to Ford's speech and the charges contained in H.R. Res. 922,
Celler permitted other congressmen to add allegations against Justice
Douglas. Among other new allegations, and perhaps providing
circumstantial evidence as to why Ford lobbied for Hutchinson's
appointment to the investigating committee, Hutchinson alleged that on at
least three occasions Justice Douglas violated the Logan Act.24 2 This Act,
first enacted in 1799, prohibits United States citizens from negotiating with
foreign governments without the express permission of the Executive
Branch.243 The Logan Act is not only designed to give the President a virtual
236. Id. at 157.
237. Id. at 166.
238. Id. at 328-31.
239. Id. at 331. The specific language of this charge was that CSDI had
sponsored and financed a "Pacem in Terris II Convocation" . . . to discuss foreign
affairs and U.S. foreign policy ... , to which Ho Chi Minh was publicly invited,
and all while the United States was in the midst of war in which Communists
directed by the same Ho Chi Minh were killing American boys fighting to give
South Vietnam the independence and freedom from aggression we had promised
that nation ....
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 210, at 46-47.
240. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 210, at 47.
241. Id. at 48.
242. Report II, supra note 232, at 351-52. Hutchinson raised these concerns in his
dissenting opinion within the Final Report. See id. It is unknown whether Hutchinson
formally asserted these allegations during the investigation or merely suggested that Justice
Douglas's actions be scrutinized under the lens of the Logan Act after the fact.
243. The Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012). The Act as rewritten in 1948, reads in part:
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monopoly over foreign policy, it is also tied to national security.244 The Act
is designed to ensure that the United States does not become obligated to a
foreign government or a cause without the express command of the
Executive Branch.245 On the other hand, not once in the Act's existence has
there ever been a successful prosecution of a violation.24 6
In one sense, Celler satisfied Ford, Wyman, and Waggonner's
demands: the committee determined to investigate each of the charges
contained in H.R. Res. 922 and opened the investigation to other charges.
What H.R. Res. 920 did not permit was a bypassing of the Judiciary
Committee to better Ford's chances of having articles of impeachment
drafted for the full House to consider. Yet, Ford and his allies professed their
dissatisfaction with H.R. Res. 920.247 On July 29, 1970, Ford complained to
Celler that H.R. Res. 920 failed to include all of his charges against Justice
Douglas and also failed to present the legal standard he espoused-that is,
holding the federal judiciary to a higher standard than that of elected
officials. 248 However, by this time, H.R. Res. 920 and its commensurate
investigation were well under way.
On August 5, 1970, Celler issued the investigative report to Congress
and informed the legislature that there was no evidence of Justice Douglas's
wrongdoing, either in regard to his judicial or nonjudicial activities.2 4 9
"Intensive investigation of the Special Subcommittee has not disclosed
credible evidence that would warrant preparation of charges on any
acceptable concept of an impeachable offense," the investigation
Any citizen ... who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly
commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign
government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or
conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to
any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of
the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
Id.
244. See id.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D.D.C. 1951); S.
PRT. No. 103-83, pt. 4, at 95 (1994); Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border
Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REv. 941, 960 (2011).
246. Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
268,271 (1966).
247. Letter from Representative Gerald Ford to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (July 29, 1970), in RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY
COMM. AND RELATED COMMS., 1813-1988, RECORDS OF THE H.R., 1789-1990, Record Group
233, Box 88, AP File (National Archives comp.).
248. Id.
249. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 1.
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concluded. 25 0 This conclusion largely broke on partisan lines, with Brooks
and Rogers in agreement.25 ' While McCulloch did not believe that
impeachment was merited, he noted that his opinion was based on a lack of
evidence.252 Hutchinson dissented from the conclusion, but he, too, did not
call for impeachment articles to be drafted. Rather, he complained that the
investigation was inherently incomplete because it did not subject witnesses
to cross-examination, so it should only be considered as merely a second
interim report.253
A brief timeline of the investigation-in terms of assessing whether the
Nixon administration or Ford had any actual evidence of Justice Douglas's
attempts to undermine national security-is helpful to understand why the
investigation failed, beyond the spurious nature of the allegation that Justice
Douglas had undermined national security.
On April 27, 1970, Justice Douglas notified Celler that he had retained
Simon Rifkind to represent him before the subcommittee. 254  Rifkind, a
former federal judge who resigned from the bench in 1950, and Justice
Douglas had been friends for more than two decades before the impeachment
hearings.255 Shortly after, Douglas added former Attorney General Ramsay
Clark and former Secretary of Defense and presidential advisor Clark
Clifford to his defense team.256 Rifkind countered Ford's claims with a
lengthy brief to the Judiciary Committee; Ford, in turn, hired a Detroit-based
law firm to try to rebut Rifkind.257
The subcommittee began its formal work on April 28, 1970, when it
sent a request to each member of the House to furnish any evidence they
250. Id. at 349.
251. Id.
252. See Richard L. Lyons, No Grounds to Impeach Justice Douglas Found, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1970.
253. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 351-52.
254. Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Representative Emanuel Celler,
Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 27, 1970), in WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 588 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014).
255. See, e.g., Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Simon Ritkind (Apr. 5,
1950), in WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 366 (Library of Cong. comp., 2014)
(lamenting Rifkind's resignation).
256. See, e.g., Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Ramsay Clark (May 7,
1970), in WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS PAPERS, 1801-1980, Box 588 (Library of Cong. Comp.,
2014).
257. Letter from Representative Gerald Ford to Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of
Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 19, 1970), in GERALD R. FORD CONGRESSIONAL
PAPERS, 1949-1973, Box R12 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Robert T. Hartmann
comp.); Letter from Representative Gerald Ford to Representative Emanuel Celler, supra note
247.
2018] 153
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
believed to be relevant to the investigation.25 8 Initially, the investigation was
scheduled to conclude in late June, based on Nixon's assurances that the
federal agencies would cooperate with the investigation; but, Celler made
little headway, in large part because the agencies' responses were not
conducted within the timelines allotted for the investigation.2 59 For instance,
Celler sought a response from the Internal Revenue Service as to whether
Justice Douglas had violated the federal tax code or had foreign sources of
income. 2 60 The commissioner did not respond until July 15.261 A similar
pattern occurred with Attorney General Mitchell, J. Edgar Hoover, and
Richard Helms. These delays prompted Celler to seek an extension of the
investigation for a further 60 days beyond June 20.262 Although the
investigation required detailed examination into Justice Douglas's tax filings
and potential relationships with litigants and other interested parties, the
investigation into matters of national security could have been closed with
quicker agency cooperation.2 63
B. General Allegations
Before examining the specific allegations against Justice Douglas in
terms of national security, it should be noted that, early in the investigation,
Celler requested the State Department to provide any evidence that would
link Justice Douglas, the Parvin Foundation, or the CSDI to governments or
personnel whom had been deemed a threat to the United States.264 Celler
258. Letter from Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House of Representatives
Judiciary Comm., to Representative Gerald Ford, (Apr. 29, 1970), in GERALD R. FORD
CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS, 1949-1973, Box R12 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Robert
T. Hartmann comp.).
259. Letter from President Richard Nixon to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (May 13, 1970), in RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY
COMM. AND RELATED COMMS., 1813-1988, RECORDS OF THE H.R., 1789-1990, Record Group
233, Box 88, AP File (National Archives comp.). Nixon assured Celler, "Therefore, in
accordance with the subcommittee's request, I shall authorize and direct appropriate officials
of the Executive Branch to furnish information within the jurisdiction of their departments
and agencies relevant to the charges against Justice Douglas and otherwise to cooperate with
the House of Representatives in this matter." Id
260. Letter from President Richard Nixon to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (June 2, 1970), in RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY
COMM. AND RELATED COMMS., 1813-1988, RECORDS OF THE H.R., 1789-1990, Record Group
233, Box 88, AP File (National Archives comp.).
261. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 19.
262. Id. at 1.
263. See id. at 13.
264. See id. at 17-18 (asking Rogers for any evidence of Justice Douglas's trips to the
Dominican Republic between 1962 and 1966, information on the Parvin Foundation, the State
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made it clear that the investigating subcommittee wanted to obtain any
evidence that Justice Douglas had violated the Logan Act. 2 65 Secretary of
State William Rogers did not respond to Celler until two months later. 2 66
Despite the length of time between the request and response, Rogers claimed
that the State Department had some information relevant to the investigation,
but he advised Celler that violations of federal law, including any laws which
violated foreign restrictions, were a matter for the Justice Department. 26 7
The Justice Department proved unhelpful to the investigation, as well.
After a June 9, 1970 meeting between Celler, McCulloch, and Attorney
General Mitchell, the Special Subcommittee was critical of the Justice
Department for being nonresponsive to their request for information. 268 It
was not until twenty days passed that Mitchell responded that the Justice
Department had no evidence pertinent to the investigation and that, in fact,
Justice Douglas had never been investigated for any criminal wrongdoing.2 69
Mitchell, however, noted that "[o]ver the years, Justice Douglas has been the
subject of various allegations and complaints about his personal life and
about his purported friendships and associations."27 0
Perhaps most distressing to Ford and the anti-Douglas faction was the
behavior of Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Nixon assured the committee on May 13 that the CIA would investigate their
files for damaging material on Justice Douglas, but it was not until July 15-
more than two months later-that Helms informed Celler that the agency
only possessed information relating to financial support given by Parvin to
CSDI through Justice Douglas, who served on the board of the foundation at
the time.27' On the one hand, the lack of pertinent evidence was a logical
conclusion since the CIA was not supposed to spy on citizens in the first
place. 27 2 "This is to be expected, as it is our policy not to concern ourselves
with United States citizens, either at home or abroad, unless they are
Department's participation in the Pacem in Terris Conferences, and trips by CSDI personnel
to North Vietnam between 1967 and 1968).
265. Id. at 18.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 21.
269. Id. at 21-22.
270. Id. at 22 (noting that information in the possession of the Internal Revenue Service
and the Securities and Exchange Commission had already been brought to the investigation
by those agencies).
271. Letter from Richard Helms, Dir., CIA, to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (July 15, 1970), in GERALD R. FORD
CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS, 1949-1973, Box R14 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Robert
T. Hartmann comp.).
272. Id.
2018] 155
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
specifically involved in some activity directly related to the foreign
intelligence field," Helms responded to Celler.2 73  However, on the other
hand, Justice Douglas had travelled to China and Soviet Russia, as well as
other overseas locations, which might have interested the CIA.2 74
Celler understood that Helms had given the subcommittee, at best, a
partial answer, and he instructed the CIA director to conduct the
investigation with greater specificity. On July 24, at a meeting between the
Special Subcommittee and the CIA, Helms informed Celler that the CIA
general counsel had searched through the agency's investigative files and
found nothing pertinent to share with the investigation, other than what had
already been disclosed regarding the CSDI financial support. 27 5 This should
have been expected, especially since the subcommittee itself had mentioned
it would not want the CIA to release any information that would prejudice
future activities of the CIA or complicate Helms's administration of the
agency.2 76 On August 10, Helms provided a final answer to Celler's
inquisitions; however, this answer merely reiterated the July 15 letter and the
July 24 meeting.277 While Helms would not fully exonerate Justice Douglas
of all accusations, he answered that the CIA had no evidence to support any
of Ford's charges against the Justice.278 Waggonner's reaction to Helms's
answer is telling of the degree to which conservatives believed Justice
Douglas had undermined national security. Waggonner refuted the CIA's
position and insisted that there was evidence Justice Douglas had intended
to weaken the military through foreign associations.279
Before turning to specific Logan Act allegations, the investigation
determined that Ford's allies' use of Points ofRebellion to show that Justice
Douglas had the intent to undermine national security was undercut by their
own actions in highlighting singular passages from the article.2 80 In reality,
273. Id.
274. See Jules Lobel, Justice Douglas the Internationalist: The Connection Between
Domestic Liberty and Foreign Policy, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN" 279, 284-
87 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990).
275. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 19-20.
276. Id. at 20-21.
277. Id..
278. Id. at 21. Helms wrote:
Accordingly I wish to inform you that, as Mr. Maury explained to Mr. Harkins, a
further review of our records has revealed nothing bearing on H. Res. 920 or the
points covered by Representative Gerald R. Ford in his statement on the floor of the
House on 15 April 1970. Therefore my letter to you of 15 July 1970 should stand
as wntten.
Id.
279. Id. at 9-10.
280. Id. at 157-66.
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Justice Douglas had simply warned of future public retribution for the
government's failure to police itself.281 Although the article had alluded to
a right of public rebellion against the government, the investigation
concluded that Justice Douglas's comments on the lack of trust in
government were taken out of context. 28 2 The investigation countered claims
that Justice Douglas would have to recuse himself from appeals arising out
of challenges to the government by noting that justices such as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter had been
prolific writers on issues of speech and the law.283 More importantly, the
investigation admonished Ford that, at the same time Justice Douglas
published the treatise, he also issued a concurrence in Illinois v. Allen in
which he urged, "The social compact has room for tolerance, patience, and
restraint, but not for sabotage and violence." 28 4 Perhaps as a matter of
political shrewdness, the investigation pointed out that Nixon's Secretary of
the Interior, Walter Hickel, had publicly warned Nixon against treating
dissenters as an external enemy on May 6, 1970.285
C. Logan Act Violations: Vietnam and Cambodia
Ford's allies accused CSDI of violating the Logan Act by inviting Ho
Chi Minh to Pacem in Terris II, a foreign policy conference in Switzerland
in which the United States' role in Vietnam was debated.2 86 CSDI had paid
Justice Douglas fees of up to $500 per day for providing seminars and
articles. 28 7 What Ford did not know was that some of the senior-most officers
in President Johnson's administration had given the CSDI permission to
speak with Ho Chi Minh, as long as it was clear that it did not obligate the
United States to any terms or concessions.2 88 More importantly, these same
officials had approved of Justice Douglas's role in CSDI's efforts to develop
281. Id.
282. Id. at 164-65.
283. Id. at 395-96.
284. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 356 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring).
285. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 392. The report also noted that Kissinger had issued a
similar warning. Id. at 389-90.
286. Id. at 143-44 (quoting H.R. Res. 920, which asserted that inviting Ho Chi Minh to
the conference while "the United States was in the midst of war in which Communists directed
by the same Ho Chi Minh were killing American boys fighting to give South Vietnam the
independence and freedom from aggression we had promised that Nation" was a violation of
the Act).
287. Id. at 143.
288. Id. at 144. The men that CSDI Director Hutchins gained permission from included
McGeorge Bundy, Nicholas Katzenbach, and Johnson himself. Id.
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a dialogue with North Vietnam.2 89 Given Johnson's approval of CSDI's
attempts to open communications with Ho Chi Minh in hopes of resolving
the conflict with North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese communists,
there was no basis for sustaining the charge under the Logan Act. 2 90 And,
while one could debate the wisdom of ajustice taking a role in foreign affairs
at the indirect behest of a president (and certainly the tacit permission, if not
encouragement, for Justice Douglas to take a role in this effort is open to
criticism), there are historic examples of justices being tasked to make the
very type of effort that Justice Douglas had undertaken.29 '
When the Associated Press quoted Hutchins accusing Johnson of
"scuttling" peace talks on the war, perhaps it was understandable that pro-
war politicians would think of accusing the CSDI of acting without the
sanction of the government and, therefore, infer Justice Douglas's violation
of the Logan Act. 2 92 But, these same politicians, and in particular Ford,
would have had access to the State Department and members in Johnson's
administration, who knew that Johnson had sanctioned the Vietnam
missions.
D. Justice Douglas, Albert Parvin, and the Dominican Republic
Justice Douglas became associated with the Parvin Foundation from its
inception in 1960 at Princeton University.293 Parvin had read Justice
Douglas's published lectures and invited him to participate in a new
foundation whose mission was to combat communism in the Middle East,
Asia, South America, and Africa by bringing "[m]en between the ages of 25
289. See id.
290. Id. By 1968, CSDI's activities were made public in a book by the group's directors,
Harry Ashmore and William Baggs. HARRY S. ASHMORE & WILLIAM C. BAGGS, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTS., MISSION TO HANOI: A CHRONICLE OF DOUBLE-DEALING IN
HIGH PLACES 9-12 (1968). It was true that Harry Ashmore travelled to Hanoi between
January 6 and January 14, 1967. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 145. However, as the
investigation discovered, Johnson sanctioned these direct meetings with Ho Chi Minh. Id.
Moreover, in 1966, Justice Douglas personally obtained Johnson's support for entering into
informal discussions with Ho Chi Minh and the communist Chinese government in the hopes
of ending the conflict. Id. On June 9, 1966, Johnson conveyed to Justice Douglas that he had
no objection with CSDI meeting Ho Chi Minh and the Peking regime. Id. at 145-46.
291. In 1949, President Harry Truman convinced Chief Justice Fred Vinson to undertake
a diplomatic mission to Premier Joseph Stalin, but the trip never occurred because the Chief
Justice and Secretary of State advised strongly against it. See JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C.
GUGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VINSON OF KENTUCKY 193 (2002).
292. Cf ASHMORE & BAGGS, supra note 290, at 11 (describing Ashmore and Baggs's
suspicions that their Hanoi exchanges had been canceled by internal operations within the
Johnson administration).
293. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 284; MURPHY, supra note 88, at 366.
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and 35" for a year of study at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson
School. 294
The foundation set up a similar program at the University of California,
Los Angeles.295 Although Justice Douglas and William Campbell, a judge
on the District Court for the District of Northern Illinois, were actively
associated with the foundation, they were not the only judges to participate.
In 1961, Justice William Brennan spoke to the foundation on the importance
of promoting independent judges in South and Central America as a
guarantor against dictatorship.296 Justice Douglas's association with the
Parvin Foundation was somewhat different than his activities in regard to
Vietnam, in that the foundation focused on a region closer to the United
States than Southeast Asia.
In addition to the increased role of the United States military in Vietnam
from 1964 through 1970, the nation's military forces were used in other parts
of the world believed to be endangered by the spread of communism,
particularly in Latin and South America. After Fidel Castro's takeover in
Cuba in 1959, the United States aggressively tried to stem the further spread
of communism throughout Latin America, and in particular the Caribbean.297
One of the problem areas arose as a result of Rafael Trujillo's dictatorial rule
over the Dominican Republic. 2 98
Trujillo's rule has been described as one of the worst dictatorships in
Latin America, 29 9 both brutal and corrupt, which warped the political and
economic framework of the country.3 00 However, he assured the United
States that he was the Western Hemisphere's most vigorous anti-
communist.30' In 1959, Dominican forces loyal to Trujillo were able to
defeat insurgents who had trained in Cuba alongside Castro's forces.3 02
While Trujillo was an anathema to both Eisenhower and Kennedy, he was
294. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 193.
295. Id.
296. Letter from Assoc. Justice William 0. Douglas to Assoc. Justice William J Brennan
(Nov. 28, 1961), in WILLIAM J. BRENNAN PAPERS, 1945-1998, Box 11:109 (Library of Cong.
comp., 2010).
297. See, e.g., JONATHAN COLMAN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 173-75
(2010).
298. Joseph S. Tulchin, The Promise of Progress: U.S. Relations with Latin America
During the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, in LYNDON JOHNSON CONFRONTS THE
WORLD 211, 233-36 (Warren I. Cohen & Nancy Bemkopf Tucker eds., 1994).
299. Id. at 234.
300. COLMAN, supra note 297, at 174.
301. STEPHEN G. RABE, EISENHOWER AND LATIN AMERICA 15 (1988).
302. Stephen G. Rabe, The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 1958-1963, in EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION 48, 52 (Peter L. Hahn & Mary Ann
Heiss eds., 2001).
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also a potential ally in the containment of communism and had been praised
by Nixon for his quest to defeat communism in Latin America.30 3
Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, and Juan Bosch was elected President
the following year.304 The Kennedy administration initially signaled its
support for Bosch, sending Vice-President Johnson to attend his
inauguration.30 5 However, within a short time, Bosch was suspected of being
pro-communist. 306 In fact, the United States ambassador to the Dominican
Republic informed Kennedy that Bosch was "a deep-cover Communist."3 07
In 1963, the Dominican Republic's military leaders deposed him.308
After Bosch's ouster, Johnson supported Donald Reid Cabral, a pro-
Western dictator 30 9 who was also ousted in a military coup just two years
later. Bosch used the resulting civil war to attempt to return to power.310 In
response, Johnson ordered United States military forces into the Dominican
Republic. 3 11 Johnson still believed Bosch to be pro-communism and wanted
to thwart his return to power.312 Johnson did not have the express approval
of either Congress or the Organization of American States to send military
forces to the Dominican Republic, and there was swift public outcry against
his actions.3 13 Nevertheless, Johnson received bipartisan support from senior
congressional leaders such as Everett Dirksen, the Senate minority leader,
and Speaker of the House McCormack.314 Bosch lost reelection in 1966 and
relocated to another country.315
Given Justice Douglas's determination to promote democracy, it is not
difficult to understand why he may have favored Bosch. But, neither the
CIA nor the State Department provided any evidence that Justice Douglas
had pushed for Bosch's return-despite Ford's forceful accusations to the
contrary. Nor was there any action on Justice Douglas's part that ran
303. But see id. at 87. On Kennedy and Trujillo, see ELIZABETH N. SAUNDERS, LEADERS
AT WAR 113 (2011); RANDALL BENNETT WOODS, FULBRIGHT 306-07 (1995).
304. H.W. BRANDS, THE WAGES OF GLOBALISM 50 (1995); Stephen G. Rabe, Controlling
Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism, in
KENNEDY'S QUEST FOR VICTORY105, 113-14 (Thomas G. Paterson ed., 1989).
305. SAUNDERS, supra note 303, at 157.
306. See id.
307. BRANDS, supra note 304 (internal quotations omitted).
308. MARK ERIC WILLIAMS, UNDERSTANDING U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 163
(2012).
309. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT 262 (1998).
310. Id. at 263.
311. Id. at 263-65.
312. Id. at 262-65.
313. Id. at 265.
314. Id. at 263-64.
315. Id. at 267.
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contrary to Johnson's foreign policy in regard to the Dominican Republic.
All the CIA could confirm was that the Parvin Foundation had given
financial assistance to the Inter-American Center for Economic and Social
Studies and that an individual named Sacha Volman had worked as an
intermediary between Parvin and the center.3 16 Volman had communicated
with Justice Douglas about obtaining World Bank support for the Dominican
Republic while Bosch was president, but nowhere in their correspondence is
there evidence that Justice Douglas assisted in this effort.3 17
In 1969, Senators Strom Thurmond and Barry Goldwater, in the midst
of the confirmation hearings on Chief Justice Warren Burger, claimed that
Justice Douglas's association with the Inter-American Center for Economic
and Social Studies reached beyond the acceptable parameters of extrajudicial
activities and aided the United States' enemies.3 18 On June 20, 1969,
Thurmond, in a speech in Tucson, accused Justice Douglas of having
undermined the Dominican Republic's stability by encouraging left-wing
revolts, making it necessary for Johnson to order the invasion.31 9
The 1960s were a time of intense nationalism, as the United States
embarked on a growing war against communism around the globe. Justice
Douglas's attempts to facilitate peaceful change in these countries through
educational initiatives gave his critics the fodder they needed to accuse him
of undermining national security simply by associating with individuals who
were even tangentially tied to these regimes.
316. Letter from Richard Helms, Dir., CIA, to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., supra note 271.
317. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 137-38 (incorporating correspondence from Volman to
Justice Douglas on April 16, 1963 in which Volman requested support for the Dominican
Republic). Neither Justice Douglas nor Parvin, or, for that matter, their accusers, likely knew
that, while Volman may have appeared to be a "shadowy figure" who conversed with anti-
American elements throughout Latin America, he was, in reality, a CIA operative. On
Volman, see JEROME R. ADAMS, LIBERATORS, PATRIOTS AND LEADERS OF LATIN AMERICA 171
(2nd ed. 2010), and KAREN M. PAGET, PATRIOTIC BETRAYAL 272 (2015). According to
Professor Paget, Volman was born in Romania, fought against the Nazis and also later against
the communist regime, and then fled to South America in the late 1940s. PAGET, supra. In
1959, Volman set up an educational initiative called the Institute of Political Education in
Costa Rica to train anti-communist, pro-democracy forces, including several Dominican
students. Id.
318. See 115 CONG. REC. 15,203-07 (1969) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see also
Kennedy, Thurmond Tangle over Douglas, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 10, 1969, at 5.
319. Transcript of Senator Strom Thurmond's Remarks at the Trunk 'N Tusk Club Dinner
(Jun. 20, 1969), in THE STROM THURMOND PAPERS (Clemson Univ. Library).
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E. Iraq and the Kurdish Emigre
Justice Douglas was also accused of violating the Logan Act by
lobbying the Immigration Service director on behalf of a Kurdish professor
who sought to remain in the United States.3 20  But, Representative
Hutchinson, who levied the accusation, misread the Act's purpose entirely.
The Logan Act is intended to prevent United States citizens outside of the
Executive Branch from lobbying foreign governments or interfering with
United States foreign policy. 3 2 ' But, Justice Douglas did not lobby the Iraqi
government. Arguably, had Justice Douglas championed the cause of
Kurdish independence without the Nixon administration's permission, he
might have run afoul of the Logan Act; but, in this instance, he simply used
established legal channels to assist a professor with his immigration
process.322 In a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice
Douglas noted that the professor's life was in danger and that he did not seek
to alter the relations between the United States and Iraq. 32 3 To this end, the
investigation concluded that Justice Douglas was innocent of trying to use
his office to influence foreign policy and that his advice to the immigration
director-based on his extensive travels to the Middle and Near East-
proved helpful to an important agency determination.324
In his dissent from the report, Hutchinson accused Justice Douglas of
acting at the behest of an unknown citizen and using his official position to
pressure the Commissioner of Immigration .325 To Hutchinson, this was a
320. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 66-67 (incorporating correspondence from Justice
Douglas to Raymond Ferrell on February 6, 1970, wherein Justice Douglas expressed his
personal knowledge of the Kurdish situation but emphasized that he did not know the
professor personally).
321. The Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. §953 (2012).
322. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 66-67. Douglas added, "These are all causes in the
Jeffersonian tradition, which the military regime which has governed Iraq since 1958 does not
honor." Id On February 6, 1970, Justice Douglas wrote to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service commissioner that, although he did not personally know Dr. Mustafa
Salih Abdulrahman, he travelled in the Kurdistani area of Northern Iraq and became
acquainted with the leaders of a Kurdish rights movement. Id. According to Justice Douglas,
this movement was in "the struggle in Iraq for the right to teach the Kurdish language, the
right to distribute Kurdish literature, and the right of Kurds to hold public office." Id
323. Id ("So I know that if Dr. Abdulrahman returns to Iraq he will be subject to severe
persecution.").
324. Id at 68-69.
325. Id at 351-52. Hutchinson argued that
[s]omeone must have asked Justice Douglas to intercede for Dr. Abdulrahman, who
according to the Justice was unknown to him. And the Justice did intercede. Who
was so uninformed to believe it proper for a Justice of the Supreme Court to lend
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clear case of a Logan Act violation. Hutchinson apparently believed that,
because there were Kurdish men serving in the Iraqi legislature, Justice
Douglas altered the relationship between the United States and Iraq by
claiming that the professor was in danger.3 26
In addition to Hutchinson's failure to articulate the Logan Act's limits,
he also seemed to ignore the fact that other justices had intervened on behalf
of persons awaiting deportation, such that Justice Douglas's actions were
neither unusual nor unknown to Congress. For instance, in 1950, when the
Court upheld a deportation order for Ms. Ellen Knauff, the Czechoslovakian-
born wife of a U.S. soldier, in Knauff v. Shaughnessy,3 27 Justice Robert
Jackson issued a stay against the deportation and ordered the government to
permit Knauff to remain in the United States while she petitioned
Congress.3 28 The House of Representatives held a hearing to assess a petition
to permit Ms. Knauff to remain permanently in the United States and passed
a specific bill allowing her to remain in the country.3 29 Although in this
instance Justice Jackson acted in expectation of congressional action, the fact
that a stay was issued against the Executive Branch indicates that a single
justice can act on behalf of a foreigner facing deportation. While it is true
that past practices alone do not provide full exoneration for breaches of
judicial ethics, Hutchinson should have understood that Justice Douglas's
use of lawful means of redress was hardly a usurpation of legislative or
executive power, to which Justice Jackson's actions arguably arose. The
investigation did not rely on Knauff to reach its conclusions, but Justice
Jackson's conduct, as it had been accepted by Congress, evidences the
spurious nature of Hutchinson's particular allegation.
his name and influence in a matter which could reach his Court; and why did the
Justice accede to such a request or pressure?
Id. at 352. Hutchinson would have had a better argument if Dr. Abdulrahman had challenged
a deportation order through the courts and his appeal against an adverse decision had risen to
the Court, such as in United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), or
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). In Knauff Justice Jackson noted in his dissent that
he would have ordered the INS not to deport Ms. Knauff, even after the Court's majority
determined she had no right to challenge her deportation. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 551-52
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's would-be order enabled a special petition to advance
through Congress, which provided Ms. Knauff the means to remain in the United States. See
Exclusion of Ellen Knauff Hearings on H.R. 7614, A Billfor the Relief of Mrs. Ellen Knauff
Before Subcomm. No. 1, H Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 5-17 (1950) (statement of
Rep. Walter, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
326. REPORT II, supra note 232, at 351-52.
327. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547.
328. H.R. 7614, 81st Cong. (1950) (enacted).
329. Id.
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All of the allegations against Justice Douglas that were based on
national security fell far short of proving that he had either violated the law
or undermined the foreign policies of the country. There were no ties
between organized crime and Justice Douglas or, for that matter, the Parvin
Foundation. The Parvin Foundation did not seek to restore Bosch to power
against a president's express statements against Bosch. Justice Douglas did
not, without the permission of the Executive Branch, try to establish relations
with the North Vietnamese government. And, Justice Douglas's efforts on
behalf of an immigrant did not arise to a violation of the Logan Act.
IV. FORDS'S FAILURE
Aside from the obvious reasons for Ford's failure to show that Justice
Douglas had undermined national security, there were two other aspects to
Ford's failure. First, a number of Republicans and conservative Democrats
in the House recognized the dangers that Ford's allegations posed to an
independent judiciary. Second, by the beginning of May 1970, Congress
began to debate limits on Nixon's authority to order military forces into
Cambodia and Laos; whether Justice Douglas had violated financial ethics
norms-perhaps a sounder allegation-became a secondary question that
was overcome by world events.
The media coverage of Ford's allegations also played a significant role
in the failure of the impeachment campaign. The news media's coverage
was critical of Ford's allegations in the immediate aftermath of his April 15
speech. Without positive reporting on the allegations, Ford and his allies
appeared to imperil an independent judiciary through callous accusations.
A. Congressional Reaction to the Final Report and to Cambodia
If Ford, or for that matter Nixon, believed that an alliance between
Republicans and Southern Democrats would pressure the investigation to
conclude that Justice Douglas had committed "high crimes or
misdemeanors," they wrongly placed confidence in the numbers of
Republican and conservative Democratic congressmen likely to join the
effort. For instance, Congressman Paul McCloskey, a California
Republican, denounced Ford's advocacy for an ambiguous impeachment
standard.33 0 McCloskey went on to urge that, although he would not defend
Justice Douglas's conduct, all of the matters raised by Ford were too remote
to justify impeachment.3 3 ' On June 24, 1970, McCloskey informed Chief
Justice Warren that he wanted to discuss the best way to proceed on ending
330. 116 CONG. REc. 12,569-76 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCloskey).
331. Id.
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the investigation.33 2 In August, McCloskey argued to Celler that Justice
Douglas had not committed any offense, even if his extrajudicial conduct
brought him personally into disrepute.333
On the Democratic Party side of the House, while Ford gained support
from many of the South's Democrats, he did not convince all Southern
Democrats to join him. For instance, Richard Walker Bolling from Missouri
publicly defended Justice Douglas as a guardian of individual rights in
explaining his support of Justice Douglas to his constituents.33 4 Likewise,
Claude Pepper, a Florida Democrat, opposed Ford and informed Celler that
he backed the investigation's conclusions.3 35 Congressmen from northern
Democratic strongholds like Daniel Rostenkowski were confronted by
constituents who sought Justice Douglas's impeachment, but Rostenkowski
merely responded that he knew of no movement to impeach Justice
Douglas.336
B. Cambodian Invasion Strengthens the Anti- War Movement
In addition to Ford's failure to gain more congressmen to push for
Justice Douglas's impeachment, the invasion into Cambodia proved to be
politically disastrous in Congress. On April 30, Senator William Fulbright,
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a long-serving
Democrat from Arkansas, demanded that the Nixon administration inform
Congress what legal basis it had to invade Cambodia.337 By the beginning
of May, more than half of the senators expressed their opposition to the
invasion, including Henry Jackson, a well-known and respected hawk who
supported most other acts of escalation.338 A similar proportion of
congressmen opposed the invasion in the House.3 3 9 On May 11, Senator
John Sherman Cooper, a Kentucky Republican, and Senator Frank Church,
332. Letter from Representative Paul N. McCloskey to Chief Justice Earl Warren (June
24, 1970), in EARL WARREN PAPERS, 1864-1974 (Manuscript Div., Library of Congress
comp., 2000).
333. See REPORT II, supra note 232, at 15-16.
334. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Richard Bolling to William J. Thebo (Aug. 31,
1970), in THE RICHARD W. BOLLING COLLECTION (LaBudde Special Collections Dep't,
UMKC Library).
335. Letter from Representative Claude Pepper to Representative Emanuel Celler,
Chairman, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 17, 1970), in EMANUEL CELLAR
PAPERS (Library of Congress comp.).
336. See letter from Representative Dan Rostenkowski to Mr. Martin Gorski (Sept. 3,
1969), in DAN ROSTENKOWSKI PAPERS, Box 127 (Loyola Univ. Chi.).
337. KENTON CLYMER, THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIA, 1969-2000, at 31 (2004).
338. Id.
339. Id.
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an Idaho Democrat, introduced a bill to limit the president's ability to direct
United States forces into operations outside of Vietnam.3 4 0 Their efforts had
only nominally succeeded by the time Justice Douglas's investigation
concluded, but when coupled with massive protests following the
Cambodian invasion, it became increasingly unlikely that Ford could
succeed in impeaching an anti-war justice in the midst of growing anti-war
sentiment-not only in the public, but in Congress, as well.
C. Media Coverage Disfavored Ford's Efforts
If Nixon or Ford hoped to distract the country from the ground invasion
in Cambodia by forcing an impeachment against Justice Douglas, their
efforts failed for reasons beyond their control. To be sure, newspaper
reporting on Ford's allegations against Justice Douglas occurred during a
period when the nation's attention could divert from the constitutional
importance of an impeachment proceeding. The ongoing conflict in
Vietnam, as well as violence in Cambodia and protests against the war,
dominated the headlines of the nation's newspapers. The day before Ford's
speech, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that Nixon entered into nuclear
arms reduction discussions with the Soviet Government.3 4' And, the day
after the speech, the New York Times reported that hundreds of ethnic
Vietnamese had been murdered in Cambodia.3 42 The country's attention was
focused on the ongoing war and the dangers that might bring at home. It was
difficult to turn the public's attention to a judicial scandal, despite Ford's
attempts to tie the two together.
Other current events continued to dominate the news cycle, blotting out
or dulling coverage of the impeachment effort. During the week after Ford's
speech, three United States astronauts aboard lunar mission Apollo 13 were
in a struggle to return to Earth after malfunctions with their spacecraft.3 43 A
Palestinian attack on the United States embassy in Amman, Jordan occurred
on the same day as Ford's speech,3 4 4 and King Hussein of Jordan demanded
that the American ambassador be recalled to the United States.3 45 By the end
340. JOHNS, supra note 2, at 284-85.
341. 'Freeze' inDoubtAs U.S., Soviets Open Arms Talks, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1970,
at 2.
342. Neak Leung, Hundreds of Bodies of Vietnamese Seen in Cambodian River, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1970, at 1.
343. See, e.g., Hopes rise for safe landing by Apollo in Pacific Today, TIMES (London),
Apr. 17, 1970, at 1; John Barbour, Apollo Rocket Burn Sets Home Course, ATLANTA CONST.,
Apr. 16, 1970, at 1A.
344. Jordanian Mob Burns U.S. Embassy Library, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 16, 1970, at
2A.
345. NIGEL ASHTON, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 143 (2008).
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of the month, major news coverage turned to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's opposition to sending military aid to Lon Nol's Cambodian
government3 46 and demonstrations on college campuses against the invasion
into Cambodia.3 47
When the nation's newspapers did cover the investigation, they did not
side with Ford, and the reporting ranged from neutral analysis to skepticism
of his intentions. The Cincinnati Enquirer's editors suggested that neither
Ford nor Nixon intended for an impeachment to succeed, but rather sought
to embarrass senators who had voted against the confirmations of
Haynsworth and Carswell.3 48  James Reston, in his syndicated column,
sarcastically questioned whether Justice Douglas's book could be considered
"a misdemeanor if not a high crime" because of the decline of literary
standards.3 4 9 The Atlanta Constitution headlined that Ford had sought a bill
for Justice Douglas's impeachment,3 50 and the Detroit Free Press informed
its readers that Ford's allegations against Justice Douglas were based on
innuendo.35 ' The Free Press editors wrote that they "could take Mr. Ford's
attack [on Justice Douglas] more seriously if [they] had greater faith in his
objectivity" and added that Ford's actions only served to undermine the
"confidence of the nation in the government's ability to govern."35 2 When
the investigation concluded that Justice Douglas had committed no
wrongdoing, the New York Times' editorial staff wrote that Justice Douglas's
"free-swinging" lifestyle was reproachful but challenged Ford and Nixon to
"call a halt to [the] squalid campaign, which threaten[ed] the integrity and
the independence of the Supreme Court."35
The Philadelphia Inquirer serves as one example to contextualize
Ford's inability to use his allegations against Justice Douglas as a means for
capturing the nation's attention. On April 12, 1970, its banner headline read:
"Apollo 13 Heads Toward the Moon."35 4 On the bottom of the first page sat
346. Key Senate Unit Opposes Sending Cambodia Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1970, at 1.
347. See, e.g., Jerry M. Flint, New Clash Erupts at Ohio State U., N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1970, at 1.
348. See The Campaign to 'Get' Justice Douglas, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970,
at 6.
349. James Reston, Editorial, Douglas, the Court, andPolitics, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 16,
1970.
350. Douglas Impeachment Move Introduced, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 16, 1970, at 13-A.
351. Resolution to Impeach Douglas Filed, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 16, 1970, at 7-B.
352. Editorial, Ford's Attack Won't Get Douglas offSupreme Court, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Apr. 17, 1970, at 6-A.
353. Editorial, The Campaign Against Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1970.
354. Apollo 13 Heads Toward the Moon, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 1970, at 1.
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the headline, "Agnew Attacks Douglas, Asks 'Examination."'35 5 Under this
headline, the Inquirer informed its readers that "Douglas, often involved in
controversy, drew publicity this week after publication of his 20th book,
'Points of Rebellion."' 35 6 However, the newspaper also reported that Senator
Richard S. Schweiker, a Pennsylvania Republican, claimed that Nixon
pressured him to vote for Carswell's confirmation.35 7 Two days later, the
Inquirer reported that the Apollo mission had to abort its lunar goal as a
result of a power failure.3 58 Underneath this headline, the newspaper
reported that a Soviet nuclear submarine had sunk off the coast of Spain, the
Israeli Air Force attacked targets near Cairo, and that four "Vietcong"
rockets missed the United States embassy in Saigon.35 9 Interestingly, and
perhaps related to Ford's effort to shore up Nixon's popularity, the Inquirer
reported the president's popularity had fallen as a result over the
administration's military policy regarding Laos.360 Coverage of the Justice
Douglas investigation appeared on page three, with the newspaper informing
its readers that Ford planned to move the House of Representatives to
investigate Justice Douglas and that he denied any link between the failed
Haynsworth and Carswell nominations and the allegations against Justice
Douglas.3 61
When the newspaper reported Ford's speech in Congress on April 16,
it placed the story on its fifth page because its first four pages were filled
with coverage of the returning Apollo mission, deaths in Vietnam, a
congressional investigation into the My Lai massacre, and plans to keep
peace talks with Russia.362 The Inquirer even placed an article about Justice
Blackmun's net worth and judicial rulings ahead of coverage about the
355. Agnew Attacks Douglas, Asks 'Examination', PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 1970, at 1.
356. Id.
357. Thomas J. Madden, 'I Was Pressured to Vote for Carswell'-Schweiker, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 1970, at 1.
358. Power Failure Cancels Landing, Apollo Fires into Return Course, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Apr. 14, 1970, at 1.
359. Russian A-Sub Reported Sunk off Spain's Coast, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1970, at
1; 4 Vietcong Rockets Miss US Embassy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2; Israeli Planes
Raid 20 Miles from Cairo, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2.
360. Louis Harris, Nixon's Popularity Drops over Fears on Laos, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr.
14, 1970, at 3.
361. Rep. Ford Leads Move to Investigate Justice Douglas' Off-Bench Activities, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1970, at 3.
362. Douglas Impeachment Move Grows, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970, at 5; Apollo
Back on Path to Earth After Rocket Corrects Course, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970, at 1;
Enemy Slays 25 Americans in Viet Action, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970, at 1; House Unit
Quizzes 6 Army Men on My Lai, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970, at 2; US. to Propose Curb
on Missiles, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1970, at 4.
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investigation into Justice Douglas.3 63  Although the hearings into Justice
Douglas continued, by the beginning of May, the story seldom appeared in
the Inquirer.
International newspapers also reported on Ford's attack on Justice
Douglas by criticizing Ford. The Times of London, Britain's largest
circulating newspaper, wrote that Ford had engaged in "a conservative-
liberal vendetta" and said that there was "some suspicion that he ha[d] the
tacit support of the White House."364 The Sydney Morning Herald reported
that Ford's "virulent attack launched efforts by a group of conservative
Republicans and Democrats to have the Judge, noted for his liberal views,
removed from the Bench."3 65 Five days later, the Times of London lauded
Celler for his promise not to "indulge in any witch-hunt."3 6 6 That the three
major newspapers of the United States' closest allies doubted the veracity of
Ford's claims should have given Ford and Nixon pause; the readers of these
newspapers could have concluded that Ford's allegations were made for a
reason other than impeachment and, in turn, undermined allied trust in
Nixon's government.
CONCLUSION
On April 16, 1970, according to John Ehrlichman, Nixon informed his
staff that Ford's efforts were likely to fail because Speaker of the House
McCormack would block any investigation into Justice Douglas.3 67 Ford's
efforts failed, in large measure because he relied on baseless allegations that
Justice Douglas undermined national security. Perhaps, at the time, Ford did
not have all of the requisite facts required to consider whether Douglas had
violated the Logan Act or consorted with Ho Chi Minh or Juan Bosch. But,
the Republican minority counsel to the investigation ultimately advised
McCulloch that neither Douglas nor CSDI violated the Logan Act.3 68 And,
yet, at no time did Ford retract his allegations that Justice Douglas violated
the Logan Act or undermined the national security of the United States.
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There may have been valid questions about Justice Douglas's
extrajudicial activities and his financial relationship with a casino owner who
had done business with an organized crime leader. In addition to the "Fortas
Fiasco," had Justice Douglas actually violated ethics norms of a financial
nature, this could have resulted in meaningful judicial reform. But, Ford
never provided a plausible explanation for his vigorous allegations that
Justice Douglas intentionally weakened the United States in the midst of the
Vietnam Conflict. Perhaps he was unwittingly goaded by Nixon into doing
so. Ultimately, none of the supposed proof was forthcoming. Ford's former
aide, Benton Becker, later alleged that Nixon had duped Ford into making
spurious allegations against Justice Douglas to deflect the public's attention
from other matters.3 69  And, though he did not directly implicate the
Cambodian invasion, the timing of Ford's speech and the Cambodian
invasion were likely more than coincidental.
There are other troubling aspects to Ford's, and by inference Nixon's,
actions, as well as those of the congressmen who allied with Ford. Nixon
certainly knew that large-scale protests were likely in response to the
Cambodian invasion, especially because Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
warned of this eventuality. Had Congress not vigorously opposed the
extension of the Vietnam Conflict into Cambodia and Laos, Justice
Douglas's opponents may have succeeded in using Points of Rebellion and
other aspects of his judicial record as a source of blame for the public's
unrest. This would have been the equivalent of accusing Justice Douglas of
stabbing the United States government in the back, and it could have created
a visible litmus test for insuring judicial deference to national security over
individual rights in future nominations.
Another troubling aspect to this episode is that, while it quickly faded
from the public's view and much of the nation's legal and historical
scholarship, none of the principal actors were held accountable for their
actions. Nixon was reelected in 1972 by a large margin over George
McGovern. Ford became Vice President after Spiro Agnew's resignation
with little opposition. In contrast, by the time the House of Representatives
issued the final report on Justice Douglas, both Celler and Rogers had lost in
their respective primary races. Justice Douglas remained on the bench, albeit
without further payments from organizations like the Parvin Foundation;
and, in the words of John Dean, he remained with an "intractable resolve."3 70
Although Ford may rightfully be remembered as a president who steadily
guided the nation, either an admission of wrongdoing on his part or an
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admonishment from the House could have created a basis for protecting
judicial independence. An admission or admonishment would have helped
ensure that future nominees' adherence to the Executive Branch's claimed
national security needs would not overtake the duties of independent
constitutional and statutory interpretation. Given the recent conduct of the
Executive Branch toward federal judges who have issued restraining orders
against entry policies into the United States, a barometer for accountability
within the Executive and Legislative Branches would well have been useful.
Perhaps it is now necessary for the model canons of judicial ethics to assure
the nation that judicial independence and adherence to constitutional
principles remains paramount over the Executive Branch's assertions of
national security needs.
